Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –
An Update by Walton, Peter
Insolvency Litigation  
and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
A report commissioned by R3 (with the support of ACCA, ICAEW,  
ICAS, ILA, IPA, IRS, JLT Specialty Ltd, Willis Taylor Watson)




Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
Organisations 
supporting the research 
R3 (the Association of Business Recovery Professionals) is the trade 
body for the UK insolvency profession. From senior partners at the ‘Big 
Four’ accountancy firms to practitioners who run their own small and 
micro-businesses, our members have extensive experience of helping 
businesses and individuals in financial distress. www.r3.org.uk
ACCA supports its 178,000 members and 455,000 students in 181 
countries, helping them to develop successful careers in accounting and 
business, with the skills required by employers. ACCA works through 
a network of 95 offices and centres and more than 7,110 Approved 
Employers worldwide, who provide high standards of employee learning 
and development. Through its public interest remit, ACCA promotes 
appropriate regulation of accounting and conducts relevant research to 
ensure accountancy continues to grow in reputation and influence.  
www.accaglobal.com
ICAEW is a world leading professional membership organisation that 
promotes, develops and supports over 145,000 chartered accountants 
worldwide. We provide qualifications and professional development, share 
our knowledge, insight and technical expertise, and protect the quality 
and integrity of the accountancy and finance profession.
As leaders in accountancy, finance and business our members have the 
knowledge, skills and commitment to maintain the highest professional 
standards and integrity. Together we contribute to the success of 
individuals, organisations, communities and economies around the world.
Because of us, people can do business with confidence. www.icaew.com
ICAS is a professional body for more than 20,000 world class business 
men and women who work in the UK and in more than 100 countries 
around the world. Our members have all achieved the internationally 
recognised and respected CA qualification (Chartered Accountant). We 
are an educator, examiner, regulator, and thought leader. www.icas.com
The ILA provides a forum for lawyers practising in the fields of insolvency 
law and restructuring practice to co-operate on matters of professional 
interest, to network, to share know-how, and to represent the ILA’s view 
to Government and to other professional bodies having an interest in 
insolvency law and restructuring practice. www.ilauk.org
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IPA - The Insolvency Practitioners Association - is a membership 
body recognised for the purposes of authorising (licensing) insolvency 
practitioners (IPs) under the Insolvency Act 1986. We are the only one 
of the recognised bodies solely involved in insolvency. www.insolvency-
practitioners.org.uk
IRS is a specialist insurance broker with a strong and well established 
presence within the insolvency industry. We provide comprehensive 
insurance and risk management solutions to the profession.   
www.insolvencyrs.com
JLT Specialty Ltd is a specialist insurance broker and risk consultant 
providing market leading industry knowledge and expertise in specialist 
fields to some of the world’s largest companies. www.jltgroup.com
Willis Towers Watson is a leading global advisory, broking and solutions 
company that helps clients around the world turn risk into a path for 
growth. With roots dating to 1828, Willis Towers Watson has 39,000 
employees in more than 120 countries. We design and deliver solutions 
that manage risk, optimize benefits, cultivate talent, and expand the 
power of capital to protect and strengthen institutions and individuals.
Insolvency Services, a part of Willis Towers Watson, is a leading 
provider of insurance and risk management solutions to the insolvency, 
restructuring and turnaround industry. Our clients rely on us for innovation 
and sector knowledge; developing market-leading services enabling our 
clients to maximise upside and achieve their realisation strategies. We 
deliver a wide range of services including insurance broking, advisory, 
bonding and risk management to insolvency practitioners and receivers. 
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Glossary of Terms
Jackson Reforms:  reforms recommended by Lord Justice Jackson in his Review of Civil Litigation 
Costs and brought into effect by the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012.
Insolvency Litigation: actions brought by liquidators, administrators and trustees in bankruptcy.
Conditional Fee Arrangements (CFAs): agreements between a lawyer and client where the lawyer 
receives payment of his or her own fees only if the action is successful. The agreement will usually 
also provide for the lawyer to benefit from a percentage uplift when the case is won limited to 100% of 
base fees and subject to assessment by the court at the request of the paying party.
After the Event (ATE) Insurance: an insurance policy which covers one party against the risk of 
having to pay the opposing party’s legal costs in the event that the action fails.
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Foreword
The world of insolvency litigation has moved on significantly since my first report in April 2014 
which considered Government data from 2010 as well as the results of an insolvency practitioner 
survey from the summer of 2013.
The much publicised two year insolvency exemption or “carve-out” from the Jackson reforms was 
due to end in April 2015 but was subsequently pushed back to an initially indeterminate date. In 
the run-up to Christmas 2015 the Ministry of Justice announced the abolition of the exemption 
would finally happen in April 2016.
My first report suggested that despite a burgeoning third party funding market, its development in 
the area of insolvency litigation was still in its early stages. No realistic alternatives were identified 
which would be able to take up the slack in the system created by the loss of the insolvency carve-
out from the Jackson reforms.
The data explained in my first report was considered by many stakeholders. There were 
Parliamentary Early Day Motions based upon it. Letters were written by business representative 
groups and professional bodies to, amongst others, the Prime Minister and the Secretary of State 
for Justice. Questions were asked in Parliament.  Suggested amendments were put forward to 
legislation as it passed through Parliament. Lord Justice Jackson re-entered the debate.
No further empirical evidence has been produced to shed light on how the insolvency litigation 
market has moved on. I was therefore very pleased when this update was commissioned as it 
permitted me to take another look at the issue. The evidence shows a remarkable increase in 
insolvency litigation activity both by insolvency practitioners and third party funders.  
The loss of the insolvency carve-out takes away a very useful tool which, in recent years, has 
been increasingly utilised by insolvency practitioners. The Government has made some statutory 
changes directed at encouraging insolvency litigation and no doubt third party funders will step 
in to pick up some of the slack. Nevertheless, it is unlikely that there will be the same level of 
insolvency litigation after April 2016. Looking overseas for inspiration, there are other options which 
might be considered. It is heartening that the Government is committed to a review of the Jackson 
reforms prior to April 2018.  Only time will tell what effect the loss of the insolvency carve-out has 
on the ability of the profession to call wrong-doers to account for their actions and what effect this 
has on creditors (including most significantly HMRC) and the wider economy.
Professor Peter Walton, 
University of Wolverhampton, 
April 2016
7




• CFA-backed insolvency litigation was used in 2014 to pursue claims whose value was likely to 
be in excess of £1bn - up from £300m in 2010.
• Approximately £240m of these claims relate to money owed to HMRC – up from £50-70m in 
2010.
• CFA use in insolvency litigation (in compulsory liquidation cases) rose 39% from 2010 to 2014, 
while the total number of compulsory liquidations fell 22%.
• The median average value of the insolvent estate (in compulsory liquidation cases in 2014), 
where CFA-backed litigation was pursued, was a debit balance of £598.
• CFA-backed insolvency litigation realised approximately £500m per year for insolvent estates 
(up from £160m in 2013), with around £120m of this owed to HMRC (based upon a survey of 
R3 members).
• Third party funding is a relatively small part of the insolvency litigation market: approximately 
160 cases per year use third party funding, realising £50m – compared to a total of 
approximately 2,300 cases per year and around £500m of realisations in cases using CFAs.
• Without the insolvency litigation exemption from the LASPO Act, 51% of appointment takers 
say none of their cases would have gone ahead.
• Impact of the end of the exemption: 
• 86% of respondents to the survey believe that less money will be returned to creditors;
• 63% will take on fewer ‘no asset’ cases;
• 49% will stop or decrease litigation;
• 54% will seek to use third party funders; 52% of survey respondents have never used third 
party funding.
• 22% will seek to use Damages Based Agreements; 90% of survey respondents have 
never used a Damages Based Agreement.
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1 Introduction
In 2013, the Jackson Reforms1 came into force and made significant changes to how civil litigation 
is conducted in the United Kingdom. The Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 
2012 (‘LASPO’) gave effect to those Reforms making changes to both law and procedure. LASPO, 
inter alia, generally abolished the right for successful claimants to claim, from a losing defendant, 
any uplift on a conditional fee agreement (‘CFA’) and the premium payable for after-the-event 
insurance (a policy taken out to safeguard against the possibility of suffering an adverse costs order 
if the claim was unsuccessful).2
Although the Jackson Reforms were intended to apply to all types of civil litigation, the then 
Government recognised that there were specific types of litigation whose characteristics made 
them different to typical civil litigation. Due to this recognition, insolvency litigation3 was granted an 
exemption from the Reforms which, when announced, was intended to operate only for two years 
and therefore to be repealed by April 2015. This two year limit on the insolvency “carve-out” was 
initially extended for an indefinite time pending further consideration by the Government4 which 
subsequently announced it would come to an end in April 2016.5
The Jackson Reforms were based upon a great deal of empirical evidence, but there was very 
little consideration of the likely impact of the Reforms on insolvency litigation specifically.6 In order 
to assist in filling this gap in the available data, R3 (with the support of ACCA, ICAEW, ICAS, IPA, 
JLT Specialty Ltd, Moon Beever and Moore Stephens LLP) commissioned the author to conduct 
empirical research in an attempt to provide as clear a picture as possible as to how insolvency 
litigation was conducted and to assess as far as was possible, the likely effect of the Jackson 
Reforms on insolvency litigation. This research was conducted towards the end of 2013 and The 
Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms on Insolvency Litigation – an Empirical Investigation (‘the 
Walton Report’)7 was published in April 2014. The Walton Report was subsequently cited in 
1 The Reforms are based upon Lord Justice  Jackson’s recommendations found in Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report 
TSO (December 2009) (see also the Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Preliminary Report Volumes One and Two TSO (May 2009) 
and the Government’s subsequent consultation Proposals for Reform of Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales 
– Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s Recommendations (Cm 7947, November 2010) and its response to the results of 
that consultation Reforming Civil Litigation Funding and Costs in England and Wales – Implementation of Lord Justice Jackson’s 
Recommendations - The Government Response (Cm 8041, March 2011).
2 These specific changes were made by amendments to the Access to Justice Act 1999.
3 In this context insolvency litigation in general terms refers to litigation brought by liquidators or administrators of companies or trustees in 
bankruptcy. See Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (Commencement No 5 and Saving Provision) Order 2013 
SI 2013/77 art 4 and the Ministerial Statement dated 24th May 2012 by the then Minister of Justice Jonathan Djanogly.
4 See the written statement by Lord Faulks QC, the Minister of State for Civil Justice on 26th February 2015.
5 The announcement was made on 17th December 2015 by Lord Faulks QC, the Minister of State for Civil Justice and may be found at: 
http://www.parliament.uk/business/publications/written-questions-answers-statements/written-statement/Commons/2015-12-17/
HCWS420/. The Government is committed to a Post Implementation Review of LASPO between April 2016 and April 2018. The Review 
will take place towards the end of the period.
6 Although a number of Parliamentary Written Questions have been answered in terms which suggest the issue of insolvency litigation 
was considered in the Parliamentary LASPO Impact Assessment, that would not appear to be the case (see for example, the answers to 
Written Questions 13344, 13345, 13342, 13343, 13333, 15406 provided by Dominic Raab MP, Parliamentary Under-Secretary (Ministry 
of Justice) in November 2015.
7 A report commissioned by R3 (with the support of ACCA, ICAEW, ICAS, IPA, JLT Specialty Ltd, Moon Beever and Moore Stephens LLP) 
which may be found at: https://www.r3.org.uk/media/documents/policy/Jackson_Campaign/Jackson_Reforms_Insolvency_Litigation_
April_2014.pdf.
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letters from professional and trade bodies to the then Secretary of State for Justice and the Prime 
Minister, and was referred to in Parliamentary debates as well as being the subject of an Early Day 
Motion which attracted 69 signatures from members of parliament.8 The Walton Report recognised 
a developing third party funding market but considered the introduction of the Jackson Reforms to 
insolvency litigation would lead to a significant reduction in the funds brought into insolvent estates 
by litigation.
The concerns raised by professional and trade bodies were recognised by many Parliamentarians 
and ultimately in February 2015 the Government announced the continuation of the insolvency 
carve-out with a further Government announcement promised by the end of 2015. Without 
providing any explanation for the reasons behind its decision, the Government announced in 
December 2015 that the carve-out would come to an end in April 2016.
This is the background to this report. In order to inform an accurate assessment of the likely effects 
of Governmental policy, R3 (with the support of ACCA, ICAEW, ICAS, ILA, IPA, JLT Specialty 
Ltd, IRS and Willis Towers Watson) has requested that I produce an update (‘the Update’) on the 
current insolvency landscape to my previous research (the Walton Report).
This Update should be read in light of the Walton Report as it is not intended to repeat the material 
found there in relation to the history and nature of insolvency litigation. This Update concentrates 
on legal changes or developments made since the beginning of 2014 and attempts to update the 
empirical evidence. Commentary is based upon new evidence gathered quantitatively as well as 
evidence gathered qualitatively from interviewing a number of practitioners.9
The following will be considered:
 2 Empirical Update on insolvency litigation including: 
2.1  Analysis of Sanctions Requests using CFAs made to the Secretary State in 2014  
 in relation to Compulsory Liquidations
2.2  Analysis of data produced from a survey of R3 members in December 2015  
 (including the use of CFAs, third party funders and damages based agreements)
2.3  Analysis of data provided by Manolete Partners plc  
 3 Statutory Changes with an impact upon insolvency litigation10
 4 Sir Rupert Jackson’s Mustill Lecture11
 5 Lessons From ‘Down Under’ – Other Options based upon the Australian system
8 See http://www.parliament.uk/edm/2014-15/673.
9 I would like to express my deeply felt thanks to Victoria Jonson, Georgina Waite and Nick Cosgrove at R3 and the members of the 
‘Jackson’ Research Committee for their advice and assistance throughout the Project.
10 Although there have been some relevant case law developments, in light of the Government announcing the end of the insolvency carve-
out, they will not be discussed in this Update. Cases of interest would include Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd (No. 3) [2015] UKSC 50; [2015] 
1 WLR 3485 which considered the recoverability regime was not a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, Re Hartmann 
Capital (in special administration) [2015] EWHC 1514 (Ch) which decided that companies subject to special administration where 
the appointment was not made under Part II of the Insolvency Act 1986 did not fall within the terms of the insolvency carve-out and 
Stevensdrake Ltd v Hunt [2015] EWHC 1527 (Ch) which emphasises that the role of insolvency practitioner is a personal one and that 
practitioners may incur significant personal liability under the terms of a CFA whilst acting in an ostensibly successful manner on behalf of 
others such as the company’s creditors.              
11 2015 Mustill Lecture entitled The Civil Justice Reforms and Whether Insolvency Litigation Should be Exempt delivered by Jackson LJ on 
16 October 2015 (‘Mustill Lecture’) and found at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mustill-jackson-lj.pdf.
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2 Empirical Update on 
Insolvency Litigation
 
The Walton Report relied upon two main datasets of empirical evidence. The first was an analysis 
of data held by the Insolvency Service in relation to 2010 which evidenced the likely amount 
of litigation being conducted with the use of CFAs by compulsory liquidators and trustees 
in bankruptcy. The Insolvency Service was required, until May 2015, to provide sanction or 
permission to such insolvency practitioners (‘IPs’), inter alia, to bring litigation on behalf of the 
estate (in the absence of such permission being provided by a creditors’ committee). The analysis 
of the 2010 data suggested that IPs were pursuing claims backed by CFAs which were valued at 
approximately £300m. The second dataset involved the results of a survey of the membership of 
R3 carried out in 2013 and suggested that CFA-backed litigation brought into insolvent estates 
between £150-160m per annum.
This Update looks to repeat some of the previous work by considering a more recent dataset held 
by the Insolvency Service (in relation only to compulsory liquidations and not bankruptcies) and to 
analyse the results of a more recent R3 membership survey carried out in December 2015.
2.1 Analysis of Sanctions Requests using CFAs made  
 to the Secretary of State in 2014 in relation to  
 Compulsory Liquidations 
Summary
The data held by the Insolvency Service shows a remarkable increase in the number of CFA-
supported actions being brought by compulsory liquidators from 2010 to 2014 (up from 96 to 
133) and a similarly remarkable increase in the value of such claims (up from £61,000,000 to over 
£250,000,000). Once extrapolated to provide a likely figure for all CFA-backed insolvency litigation, 
it seems claims to the value of at least ‘£1bn were pursued in 2014 (up from £300,000,000 in 
2010).
The activity is fairly widespread amongst the insolvency and legal profession. It has become 
increasingly common for IPs to bring actions using a CFA, typically in cases where the estate has 
been left impecunious by its former controllers.
The issue as to whether recoverability of the CFA uplift and ATE insurance premiums should have 
remained was essentially an issue for the Ministry of Justice to balance fairness to defendants on 
the one hand with the public interest on the other. Sir Rupert Jackson commented in late 201512 
that recoverability creates an unfair playing field for the litigants involved. Many IPs are of the view 
that the playing field is made uneven by the controllers of a company leaving it penniless due to 
their culpable actions. 
12 See below section 4 at p30
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As highlighted by the Walton Report, the abolition of the insolvency carve-out is likely to have two 
main effects: 
1) cases involving claims for relatively small amounts are far less likely to be pursued. Any 
damages awarded will need to meet the legal team’s base costs, its CFA uplift and the cost 
of ATE insurance. The data below shows that almost a quarter of claims are for amounts 
less than £100,000 and nearly a half for claims up to £250,000. As full recovery is itself 
fairly rare in insolvency litigation generally, such claims are likely to be seen as unattractive 
to IPs and their legal teams. 
2) Even where actions continue to be taken using CFAs and ATE insurance, the loss of 
recoverability will lead to significantly decreased funds available for distribution to creditors 
as CFA uplifts and ATE insurance premiums will need to be paid out of any damages 
awarded.
2.1A  Introduction to the Insolvency Service Data
For the calendar year 2014 there were 133 sanctions requests13 made to the Secretary of State 
for consent to commence litigation supported by a conditional fee agreement (‘CFA’). This figure 
is higher than the 96 in 2010.14 It is noteworthy that the total number of compulsory liquidations in 
2014 was significantly down on that in 2010 (3,738 as opposed to 4,792)15. These figures suggest 
that during a period when there was a 22% reduction in total numbers of compulsory liquidations, 
the same period saw an increase of 39% in CFA-backed litigation.
Although the total number of sanctions request entries recorded by the Insolvency Service for 
2014 suggests a reasonably high number of requests being made each year, this ignores the fact 
that much of the correspondence recorded involves a mixture of repeat correspondence (due to 
initial rejections or requests for further information), applications made in error (as the companies 
were in voluntary not compulsory liquidation), applications requesting sanction to compromise 
creditor claims or to pay creditors in full and many applications being merely requests for slight 
amendments to existing sanctions. 
There were, of course, a number of sanction applications made in relation to proposed litigation 
which did not involve the use of CFAs but it was apparent that approximately 85% of new 
applications to sanction litigation did involve CFAs. The minority of cases where litigation was 
proposed without using a CFA often involved estates where there were some assets available to 
fund litigation.16 There were a small number of cases where a third party funder was financing the 
action without using a CFA17 (some cases funded by third parties still utilised CFAs), another small 
minority involved an existing creditor (such as HMRC) financing the action, some cases were being 
brought overseas and were therefore subject to the domestic rules of those countries in terms of 
13 Anonymised versions of each request are replicated in the table in Appendix A. The author is most grateful to the Insolvency Service, and 
in particular to Roger Gardner and his team, for permitting access to data held by it in relation to sanctions requests.
14 For details of the data from 2010 see Walton The Likely Effect of the Jackson Reforms on Insolvency Litigation – an Empirical 
Investigation April 2014 (‘the Walton Report’) p 17 et seq.
15 See the tables available from the Insolvency Service statistics available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-
statistics-october-to-december-2014.
16 One typical example involved a claim for £800,000, the costs of which were estimated to be £10,000 where the balance on the estate 
was £150,000. Another involved an estate balance of £71,000 with a claim value of £15,000 where the likely costs of the action were 
only £5,000.
17 Some of these cases were for significant amounts, for example one case involved various claims under ss.212, 238, 423 Insolvency Act 
1986 and in relation to illegal payments of dividends in breach of s830 Companies Act 2006 where the total value of the claims was over 
£5,000,000.
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litigation funding and another small minority of cases not using a CFA were in estates where the 
claim was so small as not to warrant such funding arrangements (for example, claims of around 
the £2,000 value).
It is striking how more prevalent the use of CFAs appears to have become by 2014 when 
compared with 2010 where it was estimated that CFAs were being used in only approximately 
25% of cases.18 It is not clear what has led to this increase in use of CFAs. It may be that the 
publicity surrounding the insolvency carve-out announced in 2013 actually increased awareness 
within the insolvency profession as to the utility of CFA-backed litigation or it may just be that the 
incidence of a larger proportion of no-asset estates has increased, thus necessitating the increased 
use of CFAs.
2.1B  Value of Claims
The 2014 data shows the total value of claims being pursued was £250,283,580.19 The total 
value of claims which were the subject of sanctions requests in compulsory liquidations in 2010 
was £61,005,787.20 The value of the equivalent sanctions requests in 2014 is over four times that 
amount.
The 2014 total is based upon the 129 cases where a figure was provided by the applicant IP. 
The highest claim was for £57,000,000 and the lowest for £2,592. The mean average figure was 
£1,940,183 whilst the median figure was £293,178. Although there were a number of very valuable 
claims being pursued, 30 claims (23%) were for less than £100,000 with 60 (46%) for £250,000 or 
less. The breakdown of claims can be seen in Table 1 below.
If one accepts that the incidence and nature of insolvency litigation is likely to be very similar in 
compulsory liquidation as it is in voluntary liquidation, it is possible to extrapolate a likely total 
figure for CFA-backed litigation pursued in all liquidations in 2014. According to Insolvency Service 
statistics21 there were 3,738 compulsory liquidations in 2014 whilst there were 10,302 creditors’ 
voluntary liquidations (CVLs) – approximately 2.76 as many CVLs as compulsories. If the total 
value of compulsory liquidation CFA-backed claims is multiplied by 2.76 the resulting figure of 
£690,782,681 is the likely equivalent figure for CVLs. If these figures are added together the final 
figure for the likely value of CFA-backed litigation in all liquidations for 2014 is £941,066,261. 
This figure takes no account of CFA-backed litigation in bankruptcies (which in 2010 was 
estimated to be nearly £59m and is unlikely to be less than that in 2014 as the liquidation cases 
suggest a general increase rather than a decrease in CFA-backed litigation). There will also be a 
significant number of CFA-backed claims in administrations and some further claims in compulsory 
liquidations where the sanction of the liquidation committee was acquired. It is inconceivable that 
the total of these additional claims would be less than £59m and so it is very likely that the total 
claims for CFA-backed insolvency litigation in 2014 would be over £1bn.
18 Walton Report at p 17.
19 In order to reach this total figure some figures presented in the sanctions requests required some adjustment. For example, where 
a claim was quantified in an overseas currency, it was converted into sterling. Where a spread of figures was suggested, the figure 
recorded was a median figure falling in the middle of the spread.
20 See the Walton Report at p 21.
21 See the tables available from the Insolvency Service statistics available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/insolvency-
statistics-october-to-december-2014.
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As 24% of such debt is likely to relate to monies owed to HMRC,22 it would seem likely that at least 
£240,000,000 of the claims being pursued would relate to money owed to HMRC.
The estimate for CFA-backed litigation in insolvencies of over £1bn may be compared with the 
equivalent estimated total figure for 2010 of £300m identified in the Walton Report. 
The incidence of CFA-backed insolvency litigation has increased significantly in three years.
Table 1: Value of Claims 
2.1C  Value of Insolvent Estate
In relation to the cases involving a CFA, the value of the insolvent estate varied from between 
£329,808 at the highest to a debit balance of £25,009 as the lowest. The mean average estate 
value was £5,217 with the median being a debit balance of £598. If one ignores the relatively 
small number of relatively high value cases (18 cases involved estates with a balance of £10,000 
or more) and the one case with a significant debit balance (the £25,009 mentioned above) 
being carried by the IP, 113 cases (out of the 132 where a value was provided) showed a range 
between a credit balance of £6,500 and a debit balance of £3,356. A very large majority of cases 
(approximately 86%) therefore concerned companies which had been left with very few, if any, 
assets which could be used to fund litigation.
2.1D  Base Legal Costs
The base costs of solicitors (and counsel), prior to any uplift, showed a variation between the 
highest of £3,360,817 and the lowest of £650.23 The mean average was £133,575 with the median 
figure being £40,000.
22 According to the Office of Fair Trading approximately 24% of all unsecured debt in liquidations is owed to HMRC: see The market for 
corporate insolvency practitioners: a market study OFT1245 at footnote 6.
23 No figure was provided in 5 cases.
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used to fund litigation. 
1D  Base Legal Costs 
The base costs of solicitors (and counsel), prior to any uplift, showed a variation between the highest 
of £3,360,817 and the lowest of £650.23 The mean average was £133,575 with the median figure 
being £40,000. 
                                                          
22 According to the Office of Fair Trading approximately 24% of all unsecured debt in liquidations is owed to 
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2.1E  Likelihood of Success
The estimated likely success of the proposed action was expressed as a percentage in 59 cases 
but was described in the form of a brief narrative in 68 cases. No assessment of likely success was 
provided in 6 cases. Tables 2 and 3 show the breakdown of the two categories of case separately. 
The cases which provided a percentage show a bunching around the 60-75% mark whilst the 
narrative cases show a very large majority of actions being taken where the chance of success 
was rated as “Good”. It would appear that an assessment of likely success as being “Good” would 
include the percentage range of between 60 and 75%.
Table 2: % Likely Success 
Table 3: Narrative Likely Success
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1F Uplift Percentage 
The spread of the percentage uplift on the base costs under the terms of the proposed CFA ranged 
from 0% to 100%. The mean average of the 128 cases where a percentage was provided, was 
76.3%.24 The mean average base legal costs was £133,575 (see 1D above) and 76.3% of that figure is 
£101,918. It is this figure which in addition to the cost of any ATE insurance premium which will no 
longer be recoverable from a losing defendant once the insolvency carve-out comes to an end. 
If one considers only those cases where the claim is for less than £100,000, the effect of the loss of 
the insolvency exemption can be seen clearly. Of those claims (where complete data was recorded), 
the mean average value of the claim was £44,305.60. The mean average figure for base legal costs 
was £16,752.08 with an average uplift of 64.6% (equating to an average monetary value of 
£10,821.84). Once the uplift is added to base legal costs, the total comes to £27,573.92. This 
calculation does not include a likely ATE insurance premium nor the cost of the IP’s time. It is 
unlikely that the average surplus of £16,731.68 would cover these additional costs, let alone permit 
a dividend to unsecured creditors.  
A similar calculation may be made involving all the cases (again where the records are complete) 
where the claim is for up to £250,000 (46% of the total claims supported by a CFA). The mean 
average figure for a claim is £102,573.40. Average base legal costs are £28,798.96 with an average 
CFA uplift of 65.29% (a monetary average of £18,802.84). The total legal costs will therefore be 
47,601.80 which is a little less than half of the value of the claim. This is a more promising result but 
again assumes a full recovery is made and does not account for the IP’s time nor the cost of ATE 
insurance. 
These two sets of calculations assume that a full recovery is made on the claim but in reality the 
average recovery appears likely to be only about 50% of the value claimed (see the data in III (2) 
                                                          
24 In a number of cases, a sliding scale for the uplift was provided which increased as a case progressed. For the 
purposes of calculation, a mean average figure based upon the sliding scale has been attributed to such cases. 
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2.1F  Uplift Percentage
The spread of the percentage uplift on the base costs under the terms of the proposed CFA 
ranged from 0% to 100%. The mean average of the 128 cases where a percentage was provided, 
was 76.3%.24 The mean average base legal costs was £133,575 (see 2.1D) and 76.3% of that 
figure is £101,918. It is this figure which in addition to the cost of any ATE insurance premium 
which will no longer be recoverable from a losing defendant once the insolvency carve-out comes 
to an end.
If one considers only those cases where the claim is for less than £100,000, the effect of the 
loss of the insolvency exemption can be seen clearly. Of those claims (where complete data was 
recorded), the mean average value of the claim was £44,305.60. The mean average figure for base 
legal costs was £16,752.08 with an average uplift of 64.6% (equating to an average monetary 
value of £10,821.84). Once the uplift is added to base legal costs, the total comes to £27,573.92. 
This calculation does not include a likely ATE insurance premium nor the cost of the IP’s time. It is 
unlikely that the average surplus of £16,731.68 would cover these additional costs, let alone permit 
a dividend to unsecured creditors. 
A similar calculation may be made involving all the cases (again where the records are complete) 
where the claim is for up to £250,000 (46% of the total claims supported by a CFA). The mean 
average figure for a claim is £102,573.40. Average base legal costs are £28,798.96 with an 
average CFA uplift of 65.29% (a monetary average of £18,802.84). The total legal costs will 
therefore be £47,601.80 which is a little less than half of the value of the claim. This is a more 
promising result but again assumes a full recovery is made and does not account for the IP’s time 
nor the cost of ATE insurance.
These two sets of calculations assume that a full recovery is made on the claim but in reality the 
average recovery appears likely to be only about 50% of the value claimed (see the data in 2.2). It 
is easy to see why IPs state that claims at the lower end of the market (certainly for those valued 
at less than £100,000) will not be economically viable to pursue using a CFA once the insolvency 
exemption comes to an end. Even when pursuing claims up to £250,000, assuming a recovery of 
approximately 50% is made, the claim becomes a significant risk for the IP as little, if any, value is 
likely to find its way to the estate to pay the IP’s fees or to make a dividend to unsecured creditors. 
This suggests about half of claims currently pursued using a CFA (the 46% of claims up to a value 
of £250,000) may not be pursued, at least not using a CFA, once the insolvency exemption comes 
to an end.
Table 4 shows the spread of uplifts. It shows that the most popular % uplifts are 50%, 75% and 
100%. Although rare, there were a number of cases where the terms of a CFA agreement explicitly 
limited any return to the legal team to no more than a percentage of overall recoveries (typically 
20%). This appears to be a hybrid form of damages based agreement and may form the basis for 
CFA agreements in the future following the loss of the insolvency carve-out.
24 In a number of cases, a sliding scale for the uplift was provided which increased as a case progressed. For the purposes of calculation, a 
mean average figure based upon the sliding scale has been attributed to such cases.
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The Walton Report identified the seeming lack of consistency in how uplift percentages were 
arrived at and recommended that the profession receive guidance on how to decide appropriate 
uplifts.25 In light of the insolvency carve-out coming to an end, it may be necessary for IPs to think 
more carefully about what percentage uplift they agree. As the uplift will no longer be payable by a 
losing defendant, it will need to be paid out of funds which would otherwise be available (generally) 
to unsecured creditors. IPs’ decisions on uplift percentages will come under greater scrutiny from 
creditors. 
Table 4: % Uplift
2.1G  ATE Insurance
Out of the 133 CFA-backed sanctions requests, 115 explained how, if at all, potential liability for 
adverse costs would be covered. In 79 cases, the IP intended to take out After The Event (‘ATE’) 
insurance, whilst in an additional 9 cases, the IP explained that ATE would be taken out if it proved 
necessary (which appears to refer to cases where the IP expected no defence to be put in, but 
if one were entered, ATE insurance would be taken out then). ATE was not to be taken out in 23 
cases where the risk of the litigation would be covered by the estate or the IP firm itself. In 4 cases, 
adverse costs were to be covered by a creditor indemnity or by a third party funder. The dataset 
from 2010 is not entirely comparable to the 2014 data as it included a large number of bankruptcy 
cases involving possession and sale of a bankrupt’s home where the risk of adverse costs was low. 
It would appear that the proportion of cases where ATE insurance is taken out by IPs has remained 
broadly the same from 2010 to 2014.
The data held by the Insolvency Service does not record the cost of ATE insurance.
25 Walton Report pp 24 and 25 and Part 10 Conclusions.
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2.1H  Numbers of Appointments Taken by IPs
Table 5 shows a breakdown of the numbers of appointments taken by IPs who were engaging in 
CFA-backed litigation. In total there were 88 different appointment-taking IPs (although there were 
31 joint appointments). Most IPs (60) were involved in only one appointment but at the top end 
there was one IP with 12 and another with 15 appointments.
Table 5: Number of Appointments per IP
2.1I  Number of cases per Solicitors’ Firm
Table 6 shows the breakdown of solicitors’ firms being used in the CFA-back litigation. There are 
a small number firms who appear to do a deal of such work with one firm being instructed in 19 
cases with four other firms having instructions in between 8-11 cases. It is clear that a reasonable 
number of firms do the occasional piece of CFA-backed insolvency litigation as the data shows 
41 firms who were only instructed in one case. In total there were 58 different solicitors’ firms 
conducting CFA-backed insolvency litigation.
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Table 6: Number of cases per solicitors firm
2.1J  Types of Action
Most of the actions being brought relate to the IP taking action against former participators in 
the respective companies. Many of the actions are composite actions with more than one cause 
of action. The most common allegation is based upon breach of directors’ duties under s212 
Insolvency Act 1986 and such actions are often combined with actions attacking preferences 
under s239 Insolvency Act 1986, transactions at an undervalue under s238 Insolvency Act 1986 
or for the return of illegal dividends (under s847 Companies Act 2006) or unpaid (and often 
unauthorised) directors’ loans. The total number of causes of action is over 200 as many of the 
cases being brought involve more than one cause of action. A reasonable minority of actions 
are brought not against parties connected to the company but against outsiders, for example, 
debt actions based upon non-payment of contractually due consideration or rent, or actions for 
professional negligence. The breakdown of the actions is shown in Table 7. The Miscellaneous 
category includes, inter alia, professional negligence (2 cases), actions brought under s15 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 (2 cases), s216 Insolvency Act 1986 (‘IA 1986’) (2 
cases), s320 Companies Act 1985 the predecessor to the current s190 Companies Act 2006 (2 
cases) and actions based upon Missing Trader Intra-Community fraud (3 cases).
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Table 7: Types of Action
2.2 Analysis of data produced from a survey of R3 
members in December 2015 (including the use 
of CFAs, third party funders and damages based 
agreements)
Summary
Although the figures discussed below are likely to be conservative for the reasons mentioned, the 
amount of value brought into insolvency estates in the previous twelve month period by CFA-
backed litigation seems certain to be in excess of £500,000,000. Of this figure it appears likely 
that £120,000,000 is money owed to HMRC.26 The amount of value being brought into estates by 
litigation supported by third party funders appears to be at least £50,000,000. Damages Based 
Agreements continue to be a rarity.
Whether a CFA is entered and/or the support of a funder is secured, the legal team and funder will 
typically require a similar likelihood of percentage success before taking on a case (a mean average 
of 65-66%).
The evidence considered in the Walton Report suggested that about one half of the value of 
actions brought using a CFA was eventually brought into the estate. The overall likely figure (taken 
from the Insolvency Service data considered above) was that approximately £1bn of claims were 
pursued in 2014. The data from the R3 survey suggests at least £500,000,000 was brought into 
insolvent estates using CFAs in the previous 12 months. These findings are broadly consistent with 
the proportions suggested by the Walton Report based upon previous data that approximately half 
of the monetary value of claims chased using a CFA are eventually realised. 
26 This calculation again relies upon the Office of Fair Trading finding that approximately 24% of all unsecured debt in liquidations is owed to 
HMRC: see The market for corporate insolvency practitioners: a market study OFT1245 at footnote 6.
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Although third party funders are sometimes criticised for taking on only large cases, the R3 survey 
shows the mean average of value brought back into insolvent estates by CFA-backed litigation is 
£2,197,335 per appointment taker whilst the equivalent for third party funded cases is £816,635 
per appointment taker. There may be a number of variables at work here as a relatively small 
number of large cases are likely to increase the mean average in both categories. In addition, each 
appointment taker took on average 6.81 cases where litigation was supported by a CFA (with the 
corresponding mean average of 1.52 cases per appointment taker using a third party funder). 
The Insolvency Service data considered in the previous section suggests that nearly half of CFA-
backed cases (46%) are for amounts of £250,000 or less. Such cases appear to bring in ultimately 
approximately half of that figure. 
The data in the next section which looks at the case load of a specific third party funder suggests 
that over 60% of funded cases bring in total income of £100,000 or less. 
It would therefore appear that a large proportion of all insolvency litigation (approximately half of 
cases) brings in a total figure of around the £100,000 value, whether backed by CFAs or third party 
funders.
2.2A  Introduction R3 Membership Survey Data
The December 2015 R3 membership survey asked a number of questions on different aspects 
of insolvency litigation funding. The survey was answered by 337 members in total, with 183 
responses from or on behalf of appointment takers. In terms of quantifying the amount and value 
of litigation (and how it was funded) only answers from or on behalf of appointment takers have 
been considered in order to avoid double counting (although this is still a potential risk due to joint 
appointments). The survey asked for data and views based upon the previous 12 months’ case 
load. The anonymised results are presented in Appendix B but the main findings are discussed 
below in this section.
2.2B  Quantity and Value of CFA-backed Insolvency Litigation
Based upon the answers of 178 appointment takers, a total of 920 cases supported by CFAs 
were undertaken in the previous 12 months. The mean average number of cases was 6.81 per 
appointment taker with the median average being 2. 
A question enquiring as to how many of these cases would have gone ahead without the 
insolvency exemption to the Jackson Reforms was answered by 131 respondents. Over half of this 
number stated that none of the cases would have gone ahead without the exemption.
Of those who had undertaken CFA-backed litigation in the previous 12 months, only 14% (18 out 
of the 129 who answered this question) responded that they had had a case rejected by their legal 
team for the use of a CFA. The mean average of cases rejected was 1.83 cases per appointment 
taker who answered this question providing a total of 33 cases which had been rejected by legal 
teams.
In answer to a question asking for the total amount brought into insolvent estates by way of CFA-
backed litigation in the previous 12 months, 155 respondents answered with 90 providing a figure. 
The total brought in was £193,365,474 with a mean value of £2,197,335 per appointment taker. 
The median average per appointment taker was £242,500 which suggests that the mean average 
figure is increased significantly by a small number of large cases or by a number of appointment 
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takers with multiple cases. The total annual figure is likely to be conservative as 22 appointment 
takers stated that they did not know the value brought in during the previous 12 months (with 43 
stating that no money had been brought in by such action). The likely total number of appointment 
takers nationwide is approximately 450, and so, with the total number of appointment-taking 
respondents being 183, the response rate from all appointment takers is approximately 40%. That 
being the case the likely total amount brought into insolvent estates by use of CFA-backed litigation 
is likely to be 2 ½ times the total figure provided by the survey which would be £483,413,685 
realised from approximately 2,300 cases. As 22 appointment takers were unable to quantify 
the value brought into insolvent estates by CFA-backed litigation it is reasonable to assume this 
total figure is likely to be less than the actual figure brought in. The real figure is likely to be over 
£500,000,000. 
2.2C  How CFAs operate in practice
A question enquiring as to the average percentage likelihood of success required by legal teams 
was answered by 154 respondents. The mean average percentage success rate was 64% with the 
median average being 65%.
Respondents who had either never used a CFA or had not used a CFA in the previous 12 months 
were asked for the reasons why this was the case. Although only 44 respondents in total answered 
this question, the most popular answers were that the IPs had not come across a case where the 
use of a CFA would be appropriate, cases were too uncertain or the amount of money was too low 
to warrant action. 
2.2D  Quantity and Value of Insolvency Litigation supported by Third Party Funders
Of the 165 appointment takers who answered, almost half stated that they had, at some time, 
used third party funders, with 42 stating that they had used a funder in the previous 12 months. 
Just over a half (52%) had never used a third party funder. The total number of cases pursued with 
the assistance of a funder was 64. The mean average number of cases pursued using a funder per 
appointment taker was 1.52. As the sample of appointment takers constitutes approximately 40% 
of all appointment takers, it is again possible to extrapolate these figures by multiplying by 2½. 
This calculation suggests that a likely total of 105 appointment takers have used a funder in the 
previous 12 months bringing approximately 160 cases with the assistance of such funders.
Although a small number of respondents were unwilling to divulge the identity of the funder whom 
they used, most were willing to do so. In total 17 different third party funders were identified with 
one dominant funder supporting 22 appointment takers, with one funder supporting 3 appointment 
takers, two funders supporting 2 appointment takers and the remainder supporting 1 appointment 
taker.27
The total amount brought back into insolvent estates in the previous 12 months by using third party 
funders was answered by 80 appointment takers with only 23 providing an actual figure. The total 
amount stated to be brought into insolvent estates was £17,965,966 with a mean average figure of 
£816,635 per appointment taker. The median average figure was £175,000 per appointment taker, 
which, similarly to the figures for actions supported by CFAs considered above, suggests that the
27 According to the survey results Manolete supported 22 appointment takers, Orchard 3, Annecto and Burford 2 each and the following 
supported one appointment taker: Atlanta, Augusta, Cavendish, DAS, Delta, JLT, Judge, Maxima, Metalope, SHAD Recovery, 
Templeton, Therium and Vannin.
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mean average figure is increased significantly by a small number of large value cases. If the annual 
figure is extrapolated in the same way as the figure for CFA-backed litigation the final likely figure 
for value brought into an estate with the support of a funder is approximately £45,000,000. This 
figure is again likely to be conservative as 17 respondents stated that they did not know how much 
value had been brought in (with 40 stating that no value had been brought in). Due to the large 
number of “Don’t Knows”, the actual figure is likely to be in excess of £50,000,000 and may be 
considerably more than that.
2.2E  How Third Party Funders operate in practice
In total 120 respondents, who had either never used a third party funder or who had not used one 
in the previous 12 months, provided reasons why they had not used a funder. The most popular 
reason given was because the appointment taker used CFAs instead. The second most popular 
reason given was that cases were too uncertain to be attractive to a funder which was closely 
followed in third place by the view that a higher return was likely without the use of a funder. 
About a third of respondents also stated that the amount of money was too low for a funder to be 
interested.
When asked why they used a funder, 77 respondents gave reasons. Over half of the respondents 
stated that they did not wish to risk their own firm’s profitability and sustainability by bringing 
significant litigation. Over 40% cited that their own firm lacked capacity in terms of either 
expertise or funding to pursue the case. Nearly 20% were attracted by the fact that the cost of 
the appointment taker’s work-in-progress would be covered by the funder. A number of other 
individual views were expressed, with most being related to a lack of funds in the estate or the 
related problem of the likely legal and other costs being too significant for the legal team to risk 
carrying under the terms of a CFA.
Approximately one quarter (24.7% of the 77 who answered this question) of appointment takers, 
who had previously used a funder, had had a case rejected by a third party funder in the previous 
12 months. The mean average of cases rejected by those who had suffered a rejection was 1.47 
cases. Over 70% (54 of the 77) had not suffered a rejection.
The likelihood percentage of success required by a funder averaged out at 66% (based upon 42 
substantive answers).
2.2F  General Issues
A number of questions were put to all the R3 membership (both those who took appointments and 
those who did not, for example, solicitors and barristers). In answer to a question asking about 
how their practice would change in the event that the insolvency carve-out comes to an end, 63% 
of the 281 respondents stated that they would reduce the number of cases taken on where there 
were few or no assets. Over half (54%) would seek to use third party funders and almost half (49%) 
would stop or decrease the amount of litigation work currently carried out. About a fifth (22%) 
would carry on as before using CFAs and about the same proportion (21%) would seek to use 
Damages Based Agreements. Although still very rare, 16 respondents had undertaken a total of 30 
Damages Based Agreements in the previous 12 months. Approximately 90% of respondents had 
never used a Damages Based Agreement.
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The uncertainty surrounding the future of the insolvency exemption has led to 17% of respondents 
taking on fewer cases and 38% of respondents have seen an increase in the cost of ATE insurance 
premiums. 
An overwhelming majority of 86% (239 of 277) stated that the loss of the insolvency carve-out will 
result in less money for creditors.
2.3 Analysis of data provided by Manolete Partners plc 
2.3A  The Developing Market
It would appear that there are at least 17 funders who actively fund insolvency cases in the 
UK although most of these operate at the top end of the market where only large cases are 
considered. There appear to be between three and four funders who will take on smaller cases.28 
This is all a bit different to a couple of years ago when the Walton Report was compiled. As 
the market is rather better known now than before it suggests the market is, or has become, 
significantly larger. Although there are a number of large Third Party Funders who operate in several 
jurisdictions and across different types of commercial causes of action, there is a developing 
market in funders who specialise in UK insolvency actions. The funder with the highest profile in the 
UK market, and based upon the R3 membership survey discussed in the previous section, with a 
majority of the market share, is Manolete Partners plc (‘Manolete’). Manolete has kindly provided 
detailed data as to how its business operates with very clear information on all the cases in which it 
has been involved.
2.3B  Manolete data
Manolete was approached due to it being the most frequently used funder by the insolvency 
profession. The data provided by Manolete shows that, over its six year lifetime, it has taken on the 
funding of 117 cases with a significant majority of its cases taken on in the last three years. Of this 
total, 87 have been completed with 30 still in progress. Seventy three of the 117 cases have an 
income value of £100,000 or less.
Manolete does not use CFAs to support its litigation but pays its legal team their normal fees. In 
total it has recovered £16.2m. Its total spend on lawyers to date has been £2m. The returns from 
these actions to insolvent estates total £7.6m. As Manolete pays its own legal fees and indemnifies 
the insolvent estate for any adverse costs, a funding arrangement does not involve any risk to the 
IP or the estate. 
The data shows that Manolete has financed litigation involving 57 different IP firms.
Although there is a perception that funders such as Manolete “cherry pick” the best cases, the 
reality may be rather different. The data supplied by Manolete shows that over 90% of the cases 
which it takes on have previously been rejected by the IP’s lawyers for pursuit using a CFA or an 
action supported by a CFA has failed to deliver a result. In the words of Steven Cooklin, Manolete’s 
chief executive, the company has “very largely taken on ‘orphan’ and ‘unloved’ cases.” Although 
28 See e.g. http://www.insolvencylitigationfunding.com/insolvency-litigation and the answers to the R3 membership survey December 
2015.
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when Mr Cooklin was interviewed in the context of the Walton Report in 2013, only about 10% of 
approaches from IPs led to a funding agreement being entered, that proportion has increased in 
recent times to over 20%. This is partly due to IPs becoming more aware of the requirements of 
Manolete and is indicative of a continuing relationship with some IPs and legal teams.
One aspect of the cases taken on by Manolete is that the average time to complete a case (looking 
for these purposes only at the 87 completed cases) is 7.8 months from acceptance of the case.29 
There are no equivalent data for CFA-backed insolvency litigation.30 A small proportion (16%) of the 
Manolete cases are brought to a conclusion relatively quickly where the action is abandoned which 
may be because a strong defence has been presented or the defendant is not financially capable 
of satisfying any future judgment. 
In considering the 87 completed cases, it is interesting to note that 46 involved the purchase of 
“company actions” (which have always been capable of being assigned) whilst 41 involved funding 
of predominantly “office holder” actions which until recently were not capable of being assigned. 
It is apparent that due to the change brought about by s118 Small Business, Enterprise and 
Employment Act 2015, Manolete’s preference in future will be to purchase both company and 
office holder actions.
 
29 This average time period does not take account of investigatory work which may have been carried out prior to the action being offered 
to Manolete nor actions which are continuing.
30 The cases listed in Appendix 3 of the Walton Report show that out of 96 compulsory liquidations which involved pursuit of a legal claim 
using a CFA, 71 of the liquidations were still ongoing between 2 and 3 years later. This does not mean necessarily that the litigation was 
still ongoing just because the liquidation had not been completed but in many of the ongoing liquidations it would seem likely that the 
litigation had not been finalised.
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3 Statutory Changes with  
an impact upon insolvency 
litigation
3.1  Introduction
Insolvency law is subject to almost continuous change. Some of these amendments are 
merely tidying-up provisions but others are more significant and often effected due to policy 
considerations. The period since the Walton Report was published has witnessed a number of 
statutory changes which have the potential to impact upon insolvency litigation. This section 
considers the following statutory amendments:
•  Changes to IPs’ Fees Regime
• Power to Assign Office Holder Actions
• Abolition of Need for Sanction
• Disqualification Compensation Orders.
This section will consider each of these changes in turn and consider what effect each is likely to 
have on insolvency litigation in terms of removing money from culpable parties (usually company 
directors who have acted inappropriately) and returning it to creditors.
3.2  Changes to IPs’ Fees Regime 
It is trite law to state that an IP usually owes a duty to all creditors to maximise the assets in an 
insolvent estate. The use of CFA-backed litigation is clearly a significant weapon in the armoury of IPs 
in that, as explained in the Walton Report, the IP may bring litigation even where the estate is itself 
impecunious. A losing defendant may be ordered to pay the IP’s legal costs, plus (until April 2016) the 
CFA uplift and the ATE insurance premium. It is rare that a losing defendant in insolvency litigation is 
able to pay a full damages award and all of the adverse costs of the litigation. It is very common for 
such actions to be settled with the consequence that the legal team, the ATE insurer and the IP all 
take less than their full entitlement. The ‘hit’ that they take on their fees is often a deliberate decision 
taken to ensure, wherever possible, that there is a dividend paid to the creditors.31
From 1st October 201532 there has been a general requirement for IPs, who wish to use the 
time cost basis for their remuneration, to provide a “fees estimate” prior to the basis of their 
remuneration being agreed. In such cases, the IP must, prior to the basis of remuneration being 
agreed, provide an estimate of the likely fees33 to be incurred and an estimate of the cost of likely 
expenses which will be incurred.34 The IP’s remuneration can only exceed the fees estimate if the 
31 This point is considered in the Walton Report particularly in Parts 6 and 8. 
32 Insolvency (Amendment) Rules 2015 (SI 2015/443) para 1.
33 The term “fees estimate” is defined in a new Rule 13.13 (18A) introduced by SI 2015/443.
34 SI 2015/443 introducing for administration amendments to Rule 2.106, in liquidation amendments to Rule 4.127 and in bankruptcy 
amendments to Rule 6.138. Where the IP proposes to take a fixed fee or a fee based upon a percentage of value of assets realised or 
distributed, the IP must provide details of the work it is proposed will be undertaken and the anticipated cost of other expenses, prior to 
the basis for remuneration being agreed. If not otherwise agreed, the court may agree the IP’s remuneration. For a recent assessment of 
an IP’s claim for fees see Re Brilliant Independent Media Specialists Ltd [2015] BCC 113.
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increase is approved (usually by the same creditors who will have initially agreed to the basis for 
remuneration).35 The approval for payment of any increase in remuneration must be informed in 
that the IP must explain fully why the increase is needed.36
Although the new system of IP fees is designed to provide more creditor control over an IP’s fees, it 
may not always have a positive effect. It is likely that an IP whose fees estimate has been approved 
by the creditors is likely to draw up to the limit of that fees estimate. It would be very difficult for a 
creditor to complain if an IP did so as the creditors will have previously approved the amount. The 
new system might therefore have the unintended effect of IPs being less willing to take a hit on 
their fees than they did previously. 
The Jackson Report made virtually no reference to insolvency litigation but where it was 
mentioned there were some critical comments recorded based upon anecdotal evidence of IPs 
overcharging.37 Empirical research recently carried out by the author (jointly with his colleague 
Chris Umfreville) analysed 500 administrations dating from 2010.38 The evidence from that work 
showed that IPs were paid in full on average in 18.33% cases. The average fee drawn by IPs as a 
percentage of fees charged was 59.38%. Unsecured creditors received a dividend in 28.09% of 
cases. This evidence is drawn from cases decided before the new fees’ regime was brought in. 
The new system should ensure more transparency as to how IPs are paid and how much they are 
paid. There is less mystery now about what is going on and more creditor control over IPs’ fees. 
As suggested above, the new regime may encourage a lesser willingness for IPs to discount their 
chargeable fees if the fees estimate has been previously agreed with the likely consequence that 
there will be less money available for dividend to creditors.
Although the new fees regime is not intended to have any impact upon insolvency litigation, a 
number of IPs who were interviewed as part of this Update, did point out a number of possible 
and unintended side effects of the new regime. IPs whose fees have been approved on the normal 
time cost basis by the creditors are less likely to take on insolvency litigation where the outcome 
is uncertain (as it nearly always is) as any prolonged litigation would be likely to necessitate an 
increase in the fees estimate and a need to have that increase approved by the creditors. 
Where the estate is impecunious, IPs whose fees estimate has previously been approved (again on 
the time cost basis), are more likely to settle litigation early, at perhaps a lesser figure than before. 
As legal costs (base costs and CFA uplifts) and other costs (including ATE premiums) increase 
as litigation continues, the knowledge that those increased costs will have to be met out of any 
final figure secured from the defendant, will potentially encourage early and lower settlements, 
especially if the IP’s own fees estimate has been reached.
35 SI 2015/443 introducing new Rules 2.109AB and 2.109D (administration), 4.131AB and 4.131C (liquidation) and 6.142AB (bankruptcy). 
Any increase in the estimated IP fees or other expenses must be disclosed and explained to creditors. There is no requirement for 
approval of any increase in the other expenses incurred by the IP but any such increases must be disclosed and explained, in reports to 
creditors (see in administration the new Rule 2.47(dd), in liquidation the new Rule 4.49B (fa) and in bankruptcy the new Rule 6.78A(fa)).
36 Although it will usually be for the creditor constituency who first agreed to the basis for remuneration to agree to any increase on the 
fees estimate, the position in administration (and any subsequent liquidation) is slightly different to that in liquidation and bankruptcy. In 
administration, where the secured creditors (or the secured creditors and over 50% of preferential creditors) have agreed to the basis 
for remuneration, there is nothing in the Rules requiring their consent to any increase on the fees estimate. This takes account of the 
perceived wisdom that secured creditors, when they are unlikely to receive full payment, already exercise effective control on IP fees and 
expenses. In an administration where the secured creditors (or the secured creditors and over 50% of preferential creditors) initially agree 
to the basis of remuneration, if it subsequently becomes apparent that a distribution to unsecured creditors is possible (other than by 
virtue only of s 176A), any increase in fees may only be agreed, under the new Rules 2.109D and 4.131D, by the creditors in general (or 
the creditors’ or liquidation committee as the case may be, if there is one).
37 Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report TSO (December 2009) Chapter 28 at para 5.7.
38 Umfreville and Walton Insolvency Practitioner Fees – an empirical investigation Unpublished R3 Report May 2015.
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A further possible consequence might be, in cases where the estate is impecunious, that an 
IP’s fees are not agreed on the normal time cost basis but instead on the basis of a percentage 
of realisations. If the only value in the estate is a legal action, IPs might agree their fees to be a 
percentage of the eventual realisations. This basis for agreeing IP fees was discredited by the Cork 
Committee39 and a return to it may not be seen as progressive.
3.3  Power to Assign Office Holder Actions
From 1st October 2015 it is now possible for administrators and liquidators to assign office holder 
actions such as those for fraudulent trading,40 wrongful trading,41 transactions at an undervalue42 
and preferences.43 Section 246ZD44 Insolvency Act 1986 contains this new power and makes the 
law on assignability of office holder actions consistent with the law on assignment of company 
actions (such as actions for breach of fiduciary duty or breach of contract)45 which have been 
assignable since the nineteenth century. 
The purpose of this change is to allow actions to be assigned in circumstances where IPs are 
unable or not inclined to take action themselves but where the action might still be attractive to a 
purchasing third party.
Although some third party funders have expressed a rather lukewarm reaction to this change, the 
leading third party funder who specialises only in insolvency litigation (Manolete) has welcomed the 
change and generally is keen to take an assignment of an action rather than act as funder in an 
action being brought by the IP.
It appears too early to assess how effective this change will be in encouraging more insolvency 
litigation but it appears to be a positive development especially in cases where the action being 
brought combines office holder actions (such as for transactions at an undervalue) with company 
actions (such those for breach of fiduciary duty). Previously, it would not have been possible to 
assign all the causes actions to a third party funder. The evidence provided by Manolete, and 
considered above in section 2.3, suggests an almost 50-50 split between actions which were 
previously funded (nearly always office holder actions) with actions which were assigned (company 
actions). This is likely to alter following the changes to allow assignability of office holder actions 
with virtually all actions in future being purchased rather than merely funded.
3.4  Abolition of Need for Sanction
Since 26th May 2015, liquidators (and trustees in bankruptcy) no longer require the sanction of 
the court or a creditors’ committee (or where there was not such a committee, the Secretary of 
State or a meeting of the creditors in general) for the exercise of various powers, most notably in 
this context, the power to bring proceedings whether they be office holder or company actions.46 
39 Insolvency Law and Practice, Report of the Review Committee 1982 Cmnd. 8558 at paras 883 et seq, especially para 889 where the 
system was criticised as seldom having “any connection with the actual work done in a specific administration.”
40 Fraudulent trading actions under s213 Insolvency Act 1986 are from 1st October 2015 available to administrators, where the company is 
insolvent, as well as liquidators (see s.246ZA Insolvency Act 1986).
41 Wrongful trading actions under s214 Insolvency Act 1986 are from 1st October 2015 available to administrators, where the company is 
insolvent, as well as liquidators (see s.246ZB Insolvency Act 1986).
42 Under s238 Insolvency Act 1986.
43 Under s239 Insolvency Act 1986.
44 Introduced by s118 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
45 See the comments by Jo Swinson MP, Under Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills at Hansard 4 November 2014, Public 
Bill Committee in the House of Commons on Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Bill Session 2014-15, paras.447-448.
46 Section 120 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015 abolished the need for liquidators to obtain sanction prior to 
exercising any power under Sch 4 Insolvency Act 1986. Section 121 abolished the need for trustees in bankruptcy to obtain sanction 
prior to exercising any power under Sch 5 Insolvency Act 1986.
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The aim of this change is to allow liquidators the same freedom to take action as that enjoyed by 
administrators without the need to acquire sanction.47
It is not likely that the removal of the requirement to obtain sanction will have any significant impact 
on the incidence of insolvency litigation. It does remove a formality which would in many cases 
otherwise be required and so it will reduce slightly the cost of bringing litigation. One thing it does 
is to give complete freedom to liquidators to enter any agreement with their legal teams. Although 
not common, there were instances under the previous regime, where the sanction of the Secretary 
of State was needed, but where it was initially refused. An example of this can be found within the 
dataset held by the Insolvency Service and considered above (in section 2). In that particular case, 
it was the Secretary of State’s opinion, based upon the views of the majority creditor, HMRC, that a 
100% CFA uplift was unjustified. Only when the uplift was reduced to 75% was sanction granted.48 
This type of control or limitation is no longer possible.49 Interestingly, a different case file held at the 
Insolvency Service suggested that the view of HMRC was that the amount of legal fees agreed 
(including any uplift) was a commercial decision for the IP and not a matter with which HMRC as a 
creditor would get involved.
3.5  Disqualification Compensation Orders
In relation to conduct after 1st October 2015,50 a person disqualified as a director may also be 
made subject to a compensation order (or elect to offer a compensation undertaking) under s15A 
Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.51 The conduct relied upon by the Secretary of 
State in asking for a compensation order (or in deciding to accept a compensation undertaking) 
must relate to an insolvent company and must have caused loss to one or more creditors of the 
company. The compensation may be paid for the benefit of specific creditors, classes of creditors 
or to the company’s assets generally. The compensation payable will be quantified by considering 
the amount of loss caused and the nature of the director’s conduct.52
It will be some time before conduct carried out after 1st October 2015 becomes subject to 
disqualification proceedings where the Secretary of State also considers asking for compensation. 
Section 7(2) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986 now allows the Secretary of State 
up to three years after a company has become insolvent to bring disqualification proceedings. 
The Secretary of State then has a further two years from the date of disqualification to apply for 
compensation. It will therefore be sometime before the compensation order regime makes any 
impact upon realisations for creditors. 
It is not yet entirely clear how the Government envisages the compensation order regime 
operating. It is understood from the Insolvency Service that it anticipates applying for approximately 
50 compensation orders or undertakings in the first year of its operation (which is likely to be at 
least two or three years away). It is not intended that the new regime will step on the toes of IPs 
who wish to take action against recalcitrant directors. Indeed in quantifying any compensation, 
account must be taken of any financial contribution already made in recompense for the conduct 
in question.53 A different branch of Government, the Ministry of Justice, has explained that the 
compensation order regime “will make sure directors … who appear to have little wealth, pay a  
 
47  See the Explanatory Notes to the 2015 Act at paras 716 – 718.
48  See Appendix A Case number 51.
49  A point seemingly overlooked by Sir Rupert Jackson in his Mustill Lecture 2015 at para 7.3.
50  See SI 2015/1689, Sch 1, Part 1, para 4.
51  Inserted by s110 Small Business, Enterprise and Employment Act 2015.
52  Section 15B Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
53  Section 15B(3)(c) Company Directors Disqualification Act 1986.
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proportionate contribution in small cases (£5k-£15k) where taking formal legal proceedings would 
simply be uneconomic to bring.”54 
It may be that the Insolvency Service and the Ministry of Justice are saying the same thing here but 
in different terms. The reference to small cases within the £5,000 to £15,000 range appears to be 
directed at the quantum of the compensation being sought, rather than the total extent of the net 
liabilities of the insolvent company. If that is the case, it would appear that the compensation order 
regime is aimed at directors who have caused relatively small losses by their unfit conduct and who 
themselves are relatively impecunious. The comment that the new regime “will make sure” such 
directors pay, suggests that it will be commonplace, if not the default position, for the Insolvency 
Service, to apply for compensation in such cases. The full weight of the Government’s legal 
enforcement resources will be aimed squarely at such individuals whilst not, it seems, at those who 
have caused significant losses or who appear to have significant personal wealth.
The potential impact upon insolvency litigation of the new compensation order regime is difficult 
to predict. IPs interviewed as part of this Update project were not optimistic that it would make a 
great deal of difference. There is a perception within the profession that the Insolvency Service has 
only a limited budget to pursue disqualification activity. One consequence of this, it is often said, 
is that most disqualifications pursued by the Insolvency Service target relatively “easy kills” not the 
“real bad eggs”. If this type of defendant is pursued for compensation orders, as the Ministry of 
Justice suggests will be the case, the results may not be as beneficial as hoped. Compensation 
will only be paid by defendants who are capable of paying. If defendants towards the bottom of the 
scale are pursued, returns to creditors may be limited. 
If the compensation order regime is used only against directors who are being pursued for between 
£5,000 and £15,000 its impact on insolvency litigation will be minimal. The Insolvency Service data 
considered at 2.1B above shows that in 2014 only three cases (out of a total of 129 where values 
were provided) were pursued by compulsory liquidators using a CFA where the value of the claim 
was for £15,000 or less.
Regardless of the type of defendant pursued for compensation by the Insolvency Service, one 
significant lesson from history is that directors became far less likely to defend disqualification 
proceedings when the Disqualification Undertaking regime came in under the Insolvency Act 
2000. Prior to that the courts were “clogged up” with litigants in person defending disqualification 
proceedings. The Disqualification Undertaking regime introduced by the 2000 Act allowed 
directors to agree to disqualification without any costs implications. If the compensation 
regime is prosecuted with vigour, it is conceivable that directors will be far more likely to defend 
disqualification actions generally. The result might be a significant increase in disqualification 
hearings which will have costs implications for the Insolvency Service. 
A further point made by some IPs who were interviewed was a concern that the costs of the 
Insolvency Service disqualification enforcement activities might be funded, at least in such cases, 
out of the proceeds of any compensation order and would therefore reduce or prevent any 
dividend to creditors who were impacted by the director’s unfit conduct.
54  Letter from Lord Faulks QC, Minister of Justice, dated 26th January 2016, to a Labour Party MP.
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4 Sir Rupert Jackson’s  
Mustill Lecture55
In October 2015 Sir Rupert Jackson gave the 2015 Mustill Lecture56 specifically on whether the 
insolvency carve-out should remain. Much of what Sir Rupert says is perfectly reasonable but is 
really aimed at civil litigation generally or refers to an insolvency world which no longer exists.
Sir Rupert argued that there were four reasons why the exemption should be brought to an end. 
It would appear that the Ministry of Justice has been greatly influenced by Sir Rupert’s arguments 
in deciding to end the exemption.57 Although Sir Rupert does not appear to have said a great deal 
which was new or different from his 2010 report, his four points are considered here.
Point One emphasised that the recoverability regime was intended to operate for the benefit of 
individual claimants of modest means not for the purposes of insolvency litigation. This is of course 
true but fails to consider the public interest argument in ensuring insolvency litigation is carried out 
effectively, especially in cases where the insolvent estate has no money with which to litigate. A 
great deal of insolvency litigation is brought against the individuals whose culpable actions have 
left estates penniless. Insolvency litigation is representative litigation brought on behalf of creditors, 
many of whom would satisfy Sir Rupert’s test of being of modest means.
Point Two makes the point Sir Rupert had previously made in his Report, that recoverability “is 
an instrument of oppression, which is liable to crush defendants who have a good defence.” 
Litigation needs to be a level playing field between claimants and defendants otherwise defendants 
who have not been guilty of misconduct may “be crushed into paying up.” The recoverability 
regime does clearly encourage settlement. There is no evidence cited to support the argument 
that innocent parties have been crushed into settling. Defendants in insolvency litigation are 
frequently sophisticated users of limited liability and legal representation. Where a sound defence 
is suggested, IPs will usually walk away from pursuing litigation. I have come across no evidence 
of insolvency litigation being brought in the way Sir Rupert suggests. A point emphasised by many 
practitioners is that, in their view, the actions of defendants in insolvency litigation, typically culpable 
directors, have created an unlevel playing field in their favour and to the detriment of the creditors 
by leaving the company with no or only very few assets with which to take action to rectify their 
wrongdoing.
It is perhaps interesting to note that Sir Rupert’s criticism of the way recoverability operated 
in the context of insolvency litigation is not dissimilar to how the Government envisages the 
new directors’ disqualification compensation order regime considered above in section 3.5. As 
disqualification proceedings may be delayed for up to three years from a company’s insolvency 
and then an application for a compensation order not made until a further two years have elapsed, 
55  2015 Mustill Lecture entitled The Civil Justice Reforms and Whether Insolvency Litigation Should be Exempt delivered by Jackson LJ on 
16 October 2015 (‘Mustill Lecture’) and found at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mustill-jackson-lj.pdf.
56  2015 Mustill Lecture entitled The Civil Justice Reforms and Whether Insolvency Litigation Should be Exempt delivered by Jackson LJ on 
16 October 2015 (‘Mustill Lecture’) and found at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mustill-jackson-lj.pdf.
57  Perhaps the point made by Sir Rupert which had the most effect on the Ministry of Justice’s decision to abolish the insolvency 
exemption was his suggestion that, despite the Supreme Court’s decision in Lawrence v Fen Tigers Ltd (No. 3) [2015] UKSC 50; [2015] 
1 WLR 3485 which held that the recoverability regime in general terms was not a breach of the European Convention on Human Rights, 
the retention of recoverability for insolvency litigation only might be a breach of Convention rights. 
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it could be argued that the delay in bringing proceedings is itself oppressive to a defendant. If one 
adds to the mix the way disqualification litigation is conducted with the threat that if the defendant 
fails to offer an undertaking, he or she will be liable for the Secretary of State’s costs, a defendant 
who is reluctant to risk the costs of a trial could feel strong-armed into providing a disqualification 
and compensation undertaking. He or she might be seen to “be crushed into paying up”. It is, of 
course, a question of balancing the rights of individual defendants on the one hand with the public 
interest on the other. A number of IPs interviewed for this Update see a similarity between how the 
disqualification compensation regime is to operate with how recoverability has previously operated. 
Both encourage a defendant to settle.
Point Three again repeats the point previously made by Sir Rupert that recoverability drives up 
overall costs of litigation. The overwhelming view of IPs who responded to the December 2015 R3 
survey (and others to whom I have spoken), is that the actions of directors of insolvent companies 
frequently make litigation an uneven playing field by leaving a company with no assets. Those 
practitioners argue, especially with small value claims of £100,000 or less, that the absence of 
the insolvency carve-out will make it far less likely that action will be taken by IPs. There is clearly 
a public interest in ensuring litigation is carried out fairly with proportionate costs. There is also a 
public interest in ensuring those guilty of defeating creditors’ claims are brought to justice. This 
is the difficult balance which the law must try to achieve. Sir Rupert’s general points are clearly 
reasonable but do not take account of the nature of insolvency litigation.
Point Four argues that insolvency litigation is perfectly possible without recoverability. It is true 
that IPs did, of course, litigate successfully before recoverability was introduced in 2000. The 
problem, pointed out by practitioners with decades of experience, with the picture which Sir 
Rupert paints of insolvency litigation is that he is out-of-date. In the last century there were far 
fewer no-asset insolvent estates. Today’s asset-based lenders such as debt factors and invoice 
discounters were fairly rarely encountered and there were a relatively small number of them. 
This is quite different now and a company’s working capital is frequently not available to the IP 
to bring any action. Creditors, especially HMRC, were more willing to fund an action by an IP. 
HMRC was largely a preferential creditor in those days and so often stood to benefit significantly 
from successful litigation. As an unsecured creditor today, the incentive is not so great and, even 
if willing to support action, HMRC has extremely limited means to do so. Ordinary creditors who 
have already lost money are reluctant to risk more money on the off chance that they might recover 
some of their original debt (and get their further contribution back). In the twentieth century it was 
very common for a company to have a single secured creditor who would often fund insolvency 
litigation. Active creditors are a rarity nowadays.
The alternatives to the recoverability regime suggested by Sir Rupert include the use of CFAs 
without recoverability, increased use of funders58 and the possible use of Damages Based 
Agreements which he accepts are problematic in practice at present. The future may hold a fixed 
costs regime for claims of £250,000 or less but that appears to be some way off.
The Walton Report explained that insolvency litigation has always been regarded as different to 
ordinary civil litigation due to its public benefit element. In addition to the alternatives suggested 
by Sir Rupert, perhaps it is time for the Government to consider other alternatives. Two possible 
models from Australia are discussed in the next section.
58  It will be interesting to see if the Government brings into effect Sir Rupert’s previous recommendation that once the third party funding 
market had developed sufficiently, in the absence of a voluntary code of conduct to which all funders sign up, “there may well be a need 
for full statutory regulation” (Review of Civil Litigation Costs: Final Report TSO (December 2009) Chapter 11, para. 2.12).
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5 Lessons From ‘Down Under’ 
– Other Options based upon 
the Australian system
5.1  Section 564 Corporations Act 200159
Section 564 of the Australian Corporations Act 200160 gives the Court power to make an order 
in favour of creditors who have funded or indemnified the liquidator in litigation to recover, protect 
or preserve property for the benefit of the liquidation. If the litigation is successful, the liquidator 
will apply to the Court to assess how the funding creditors should be rewarded for providing the 
financial support for the action. Section 564 states that ”the Court may make such orders, as it 
deems just with respect to the distribution of that property and the amount of those expenses so 
recovered with a view to giving those creditors an advantage over others in consideration of the 
risk assumed by them”. The decision whether or not to make an order and, if so, on what terms, is 
left to the discretion of the Court after the recovery or preservation has been made.
There is a good deal of case law and commentary on s564 and it is clearly a well-established 
practice in Australia61 for creditors of insolvent companies to agree to provide finance to enforce 
rights of the insolvent company often against the company’s previous management team. It is 
common for the Court to order that, where the litigation is successful, the creditors receive back 
an amount equal to the funding or indemnity which they provided plus an uplift often in terms of a 
multiplier. The creditors also retain their rights to participate in any dividend in the liquidation (which 
may be possible only because of the successful litigation).
An example of how s564 worked very successfully and to the benefit of the funding creditors is 
the liquidation of Babcock & Brown Ltd.62 The case involved over 1,200 individual creditors each 
contributing $400 to the funding of the liquidator’s investigations into the company’s affairs which 
ultimately resulted in a substantial settlement of claims against company directors and its former 
auditor. The Court made an order under s564 that, in addition to receiving the repayment of their 
financial contribution to the fighting fund, the funding creditors were also to receive an uplift of ten 
times the amount of their respective contributions. All these payments were ordered to be made in 
priority to the payment of any dividend to unsecured creditors generally. 
Although the Babcock & Brown case involved “crowd funding” in a large insolvency, s564 is also 
seen to work effectively in smaller cases where there is only one63 or two64 funding creditors.
59  I am most grateful to Mark Wellard of Charles Darwin University for his guidance on how the Australian Fair Entitlement Recovery 
Programme operates and how it came into being.
60  For the full text of s564 see http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/legis/cth/consol_act/ca2001172/s564.html.
61  Section 564 is derived from its bankruptcy equivalent found in s109(10) of the Australian Bankruptcy Act 1966.
62  For details see the liquidator’s report to creditors found at: http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-Australia/Local%20Assets/
Documents/Services/CRG/Bus%20under%20admin/Babcock%20and%20Brown/Deloitte_BBL_circular_20Mar2012.pdf.
63  See e.g. Re Allquip (W.A.) Pty Ltd (in liquidation) [1997] FCA 1368 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/
FCA/1997/1368.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=cartco.
64  See e.g. Re Glenisia Investments Pty (In Liquidation) [1995] FCA 1490 http://www.austlii.edu.au/cgi-bin/sinodisp/au/cases/cth/
FCA/1995/1490.html?stem=0&synonyms=0&query=glenisia.
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There are significant benefits to the s564 scheme. One oft expressed concern of insolvency 
mechanisms is that creditors, especially unsecured creditors, become completely disenfranchised. 
They are loath to waste their time attending creditors’ meetings and are usually extremely reluctant 
to fund litigation as they see it as “throwing good money after bad”. Even if the litigation is 
successful, there is no mechanism available in the UK whereby they are able to receive any sum 
back from the action beyond their contribution to the fighting fund (and if there are sufficient assets 
to a dividend from the estate). Section 564 answers this weakness by promising an increased 
return to funding creditors ahead of other unsecured creditors who chose not to participate in the 
funding.65
Section 564 also encourages creditors to remain interested in the insolvency66 and where culpable 
directors are aware of the strength of support from the creditor body to hold them to account for 
their wrongdoing, the demonstration of that commitment by risking further funds is likely to be a 
significant factor in such directors suggesting early settlement of the claim.
One concern expressed about both the recoverability of CFA uplifts (and ATE premiums) and 
the use of third party funders is that parties outside of the creditor group get to benefit in varying 
ways from the eventual proceeds of an action. If an action is funded by existing creditors with the 
promise of an increased return, all the proceeds go to those inside the creditor group (subject to 
costs and expenses).
From the point of view of an IP, it was often seen under the insolvency carve-out to be more 
attractive for the IP to use a CFA to litigate than to consider a third party funder. In theory, 
recoverability of the CFA uplift from a losing defendant should mean that, absent unusual cases, 
a better return is likely to the estate than would be the case if the action was brought with the 
support of a funder. There is no percentage deduction and all legal fees and uplift are capable of 
being recovered. The experience of Manolete supports this idea in that it is only approached in 
90% of cases once the IP’s legal team have rejected the use of a CFA. In future, such recoverability 
will no longer be available and so a large proportion of any damages recovered will go to people 
outside the creditor group (either the legal team under a CFA or a third party funder under a 
funding agreement).
If a version of s564 were to be introduced in the UK, the IP with a “no asset” estate but who 
is considering litigation would perhaps first consider asking creditors if they wished to support 
the action financially before considering a possible CFA or use of a third party funder. It would 
enfranchise creditors to some extent even if they chose not to take up the offer. It would also 
perhaps give those creditors a clearer understanding of the difficult commercial decisions facing 
an IP. If creditors are unwilling to support any action, it would be difficult for them to complain 
subsequently if the IP prosecuted the action either using a CFA (with or without the support of a 
funder) or who assigned the cause of action directly to a funder.
As there is a pre-existing body of case law decided under s564, there would be ready-made 
guidance available to the UK courts in making assessments of how funding creditors’ reward 
should be quantified. 
65  The recent case of Low v Barnet [2015] FCA 1386 suggests that a creditor cannot receive more than 100% of the total debt owed 
(together with interest) by means of an order made under s564.
66  The court commented in Filsee Pty Ltd & Ors v Horne [2014] FCCA 2269 that the object of such provisions is to “encourage creditors 
to indemnify [IPs] in relation to proceedings for recovery of property; and …reward creditors who take the risks and bear the burden 
of litigation … The discretion is broad and general but is to be exercised having regard to the desirability, in the public interest, of 
encouraging creditors to indemnify [IPs]” (paras 9 -10 per Judge Harnett).
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An article on the website of a leading Australian insolvency practitioner firm67 entitled “Creditor 
funding where the liquidator has limited means to recover or preserve company assets” concludes 
with the following observations on s564:
“Often the whole amount available in a winding up has been sourced from recoveries made 
possible by reason of the contribution made by funding creditors. Such creditors, taking advantage 
of the financial incentives offered under section 564, have made a commercial decision to become 
actively involved in the winding up process by investing time and money assisting the liquidator 
to recover or preserve company property. At the same time the public interest has been served in 
ensuring that assets of the company in winding up will be maximized, and misconduct with respect 
to companies in financial difficulties will be discouraged.”
5.2  Australian Fair Entitlement Recovery Programme68 
The Australian Fair Entitlements Guarantee (‘FEG’) was introduced in 201269 and operates in a 
similar way to its UK equivalent Redundancy Payments Service in providing financial support to 
employees who lose their jobs when their employer becomes formally insolvent. The FEG operates 
in a broadly similar way to the UK scheme in that in relation to payments made to employees, the 
FEG has a right of subrogation against the insolvent employer. Employees in Australia have a status 
similar to the preferential status of limited employee liabilities in the UK under Sch 6, Insolvency Act 
1986 and the FEG stands in the shoes of those employees when trying to recoup money paid out 
to employees in relation to their priority status.
It has been recognised that the Australian Government might improve its overall financial exposure 
under the FEG by taking a more active role in funding the enforcement of claims against directors 
of insolvent companies.70 A previous Active Creditor Pilot scheme showed that Government 
funding used to support such actions (leading to a return to creditors) showed a 562 per 
cent return on the cost of providing that funding.71 The Australian Government’s Productivity 
Commission subsequently recommended that the Active Creditor Pilot become permanent and the 
Australian Government has subsequently created the Fair Entitlement Recovery Programme which 
was launched in July 2015. This scheme allows liquidators of impecunious estates to apply for 
funding to support litigation.72 
Although there is no evidence that the UK Redundancy Payments Service engages in litigation funding, 
it is clear that on occasion HMRC does support or indemnify IPs who take legal action on behalf of 
creditors. Sir Rupert Jackson in his Mustill Lecture appears to express confusion as to why HMRC is 
currently reluctant to engage in significant support for insolvency litigation.73 Perhaps if the Government 
considered the introduction of an active creditor scheme similar to the one in Australia (supported by 
either or both the Redundancy Payments Service or HMRC) more actions could be pursued.
67  http://briferrier.com.au/insights-and-news/technical-insights/creditor-funding-where-the-liquidator-has-limited-means-to-recover-or-
preserve-company-assets/. The firm is BVI Ferrier and the article is dated March 2015.
68  I am most grateful to Mark Wellard of Charles Darwin University for his guidance on how the Australian Fair Entitlement Recovery 
Programme operates and how it came into being.
69  Prior to 2012, a similar scheme called the General Employee Entitlements and Redundancy Scheme operated in Australia (2001 – 2012) 
and before that the similar Employee Entitlements Support Scheme operated (from 2000). See generally Production Commission 2015, 
Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure, Final Report 75, Canberra.
70  Production Commission, Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure at p 421.
71  Wellard (2013) Bailing out the FEG: is the Fair Entitlements Guarantee (formerly GEERS) Approaching its own Fiscal Cliff? Queensland 
University of Technology at p 8.
72  Production Commission, Business Set-Up, Transfer and Closure at p 421.
73  2015 Mustill Lecture entitled The Civil Justice Reforms and Whether Insolvency Litigation Should be Exempt delivered by Jackson LJ 
on 16 October 2015 (‘Mustill Lecture’) and found at: https://www.judiciary.gov.uk/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/mustill-jackson-lj.pdf at 
para 8.4.
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6  Conclusions
The Government’s decision to remove the insolvency exemption has been made by the Ministry of 
Justice and appears to be based upon general litigation policy considerations rather than looking at 
the specific challenges and public policy imperatives present in insolvency litigation. The evidence 
suggests that a large proportion of CFA-backed actions previously pursued by IPs, mainly in cases 
where there were no or minimal assets available to fund litigation, will not be financially viable 
using CFAs in the future. It is undoubtedly the case that the third party funding market will pick up 
a number of these cases but it is difficult to see it taking on all of the cases which IPs view as no 
longer financially viable under a CFA.
Rather unpredictably, the announcement in 201274 that the insolvency exemption from the LASPO 
reforms would come to an end, initially in April 2015 but then extended to April 2016, appears 
to have led to an increase in the use of CFA-backed litigation by IPs. This may be explained by a 
greater awareness of the way in which the recoverability regime operated to the benefit of insolvent 
estates. Whatever the reasons, it is clear that the last two years saw a significant increase in the 
use by IPs of CFAs. It would also seem that IPs have shown a greater openness to working with, 
or assigning claims to, third party funders.
It is estimated that claims valued at over £1bn were pursued by IPs in 2014 using CFAs (up from 
the figure from 2010 suggested in the Walton Report of £300m). These cases are likely to make 
up a sizeable majority of all insolvency litigation (approximately 85%). It is also noteworthy that a 
similar percentage of cases (86%) appear to involve estates with no or few assets. It appears that 
approximately half the total value claimed was eventually recovered by IPs (a figure in excess of 
£500m). The market for third parties funding insolvency litigation appears to have expanded in the 
same timeframe and is likely to realise at least £50m per annum for insolvent estates. 
The third party funding market is still growing and although it appears currently to have garnered 
approximately 10% of the overall insolvency litigation market this may be a conservative estimate 
and is likely to increase further now that the insolvency exemption to LASPO has been removed. 
Recent changes to legislation which permit an IP to assign all types of causes of action are 
designed to encourage the funding market.
In large value cases (where the value claimed exceeds £250,000) an IP now has a more difficult 
commercial decision to make than in the recent past as how best to realise the value of the claim. 
The loss of recoverability means that the cost of CFA uplifts and ATE insurance premiums will need 
to be met by any eventual settlement or damages award. Once the IP’s own fees are factored in, 
there may be cases where the sale of a cause of action to a third party funder may reap a better 
return for the creditors than CFA-backed litigation run by the IP. It would seem a good time for the 
IP profession to receive some clear guidance on how to agree CFA uplifts.
Under the pre-LASPO regime, most IPs would view a CFA as their preferred option in most cases 
with an approach to a third party funder only considered in unusual circumstances or where a CFA 
could not be arranged. This will change and IPs will need to consider more carefully what course of 
action will lead to a more beneficial result for creditors. It is conceivable that IPs who continue  
 
74  See the Ministerial Statement dated 24th May 2012 by the then Minister of Justice Jonathan Djanogly.
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to agree 100% CFA uplifts as a matter of course, may find themselves accused of a breach of 
duty by creditors if the payment of such uplifts contributes to a reduced dividend (or no dividend 
at all) to unsecured creditors. IPs will need to consider alternative funding arrangements including 
approaching third party funders. Indeed half of respondents to the R3 survey see that the loss of 
the LASPO exemption will lead them to consider approaching funders when perhaps previously 
they would not. Worryingly, from a public policy point of view, half of respondents believe they will 
reduce or avoid insolvency litigation in future.
IPs will be in a difficult position. What alternatives are there? If the secondary legislation around 
damages based agreements can be amended, it might be that IPs can use a hybrid version of 
that mechanism to fund some actions.75 Nearly four years after LASPO, this possibility remains just 
that, a future possibility. Although the Insolvency Service intends to use its new statutory powers 
to request a compensation order (or undertaking) following disqualification of a director, these 
powers are not likely to involve large numbers of cases. If the Ministry of Justice’s take on the 
compensation order regime is accurate, it will be aimed at directors at the bottom of the economic 
pile. Either way it will not realistically be capable of being pursued for at least two or three years 
and will have only a minimal impact on the type of cases which are currently brought by IPs. Few 
other options are currently available for chasing errant directors (and others who are guilty of 
culpable behaviour in relation to an insolvent estate).
Perhaps it is time for the Government to consider alternatives designed to enfranchise and reward 
those who suffer most in an insolvency – the creditors. The previous Government was keen 
to encourage creditors to be fully engaged in the formal insolvency of their debtors.76 There is 
currently little incentive for creditors to support financially litigation by IPs. This could be changed 
in a manner which is likely to engage and benefit creditors, force culpable persons to compensate 
for loss caused by their actions and which would encourage a better understanding of the difficult 
task faced by IPs. If funding options similar to the Australian s564 were to be introduced, creditors 
would have the chance to fund litigation but with the incentive to recover a larger amount than 
their funding contribution. They would also stand to benefit from any eventual creditor dividend. If 
creditors were offered the opportunity to engage in such funding they could either accept or refuse 
the challenge. If the proposal is rejected, the IP could then consider other funding options including 
the use of a CFA or a third party funder. If a new scheme based upon the Australian model were 
to be introduced, the publicity surrounding its introduction might lead to a level of awareness both 
within the profession and within creditor bodies which might serve to encourage creditors to take 
part in the new scheme.
In addition, it is clearly Sir Rupert Jackson’s view that HMRC should do more to fund insolvency 
litigation where it is a creditor. The same could be said of the Redundancy Payments Service. 
There would seem every reason for the Government to consider filling the funding gap created by 
the ending of the insolvency exemption by creating a form of Active Creditor Scheme which would 
permit IPs to apply to either or both HMRC and the Redundancy Payments Service for funding. 
The Australian experience of such a scheme is that it leads to a return of over 500% of the cost of 
providing such funding.
75  See the commentary in the Walton Report at pp 42-43.
76  See generally Transparency and Trust: Enhancing the Transparency of UK Company Ownership and Increasing Trust in UK Business 
Department for Business, Innovation and Skills Discussion Paper 2013.
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Insolvency litigation is not ordinary litigation.77  In commenting on the nature of insolvency litigation, 
Lord Millett, in Re Pantmaenog Timber Co Ltd,78 endorsed the views of the Cork Committee79 in 
the following terms: 
“From the earliest days of the joint stock company the liquidator has exercised functions which 
serve the public interest and not merely the financial interests of the creditors and contributories. 
The Cork Committee observed (in para 192 of its report) that: ‘The law of insolvency takes 
the form of a compact to which there are three parties: the debtor, his creditors and society.’ In 
consequence insolvency proceedings: ‘have never been treated in English law as an exclusively 
private matter between the debtor and his creditors; the community itself has always been 
recognised as having an important interest in them’ (para 1734).”80
Perhaps it is time for the current Government to re-consider how best it can encourage the public 
interest elements of such litigation whilst recognising broader principles of conducting litigation fairly.
77  See generally the discussion in Part 3 of the Walton Report.
78  [2004] 1 AC 158.
79  Review Committee on Insolvency Law and Practice (1982 Cmnd. 8558).
80  Ibid at para 52. Similar comments were made by Lord Walker in the same case at paras 78-79. See also Dillon LJ in Bishopsgate 
Investment Management Ltd v Maxwell [1993] Ch 1 where his Lordship referred to the law’s previous inability to deal adequately with the 
dishonesty or malpractice of bankrupts and directors being “a matter of public concern, and there is a public interest in putting it right.”
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Appendix A 
Anonymised Sanctions Requests in 2014
Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE





2 212, 238,239 
and 320 CA
450,000 60,000 -1,407 Counsel’s 
advice
100 Yes  
3 127, 212, 238, 
and 423  
27,000 22,500 12 Solicitors 
believe there 
is a claim to 
pursue
40 Yes
4 127 156,000 4,000 -1,114 Due to 
freezing 
orders the 
IP has no 
alternative 
than to 






5 DLA 58,900 20% of 
recoveries
-1,860 Not stated 20% of 
recoveries
No








200,000 0 75 100 Yes
7 MTIC fraud 750,000 150,000 4,545 70 75 Yes
8 Debt 16,560 11,750 0 80 100 Not yet - if 
needed will 
be paid for  
by IP’s firm
9 212, 239 74,708 49,402 -154 Not Stated 30 Yes
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
10 212 2,000,000 100,000 12,407 65 100 Yes
11 212 700,000 100,000 12,407 65 100 Yes
12 212 2,000,000 100,000 12,407 65 100 yes
13 212 60,000 15,000 1,302 70 50 Yes
14 Guarantee 1,500,000 332,000 0 Good 30 Yes
15 212 38,733,444 1,500,000 0 Not stated 75 No HMRC 
indemnity
16 212 251,932 12,500 -841 Good 50 Not stated
17 212 590,000 70,000 -453 Not stated 74.5 Not stated
18 Prof negligence 57,000,000 3,360,817 9,194 65 70 Yes 
19 212, 213, 423 
and 320 CA
465,171 100,000 -1,423 Solicitors’ 
advice
100 Yes  
20 238, 239 and 
423
230,000 40,000 -1,235 Good 100 Yes






22 212 905,000 225,000 -843 65 75 Yes
23 212 445,792 42,500 -1,836 53 100 Yes
24 212 190,386 7,500 -1,158 Good 100 No
25 212 550,391 15,000 -1,136 Good 50 No
26 212 385,452 25,000 26,836 Good 100 Yes
27 212, 213 and 
127
1,375,000 120,000 326,808 75 95 Yes
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
28 Debt 142,560 20,000 775 Good 50 Yes
29 212, 213 4,000,000 700,000 -1,876 65 92 Not stated
30 127, 239 200,000 118,019 14,122 Good 0 No
31 Debt 225,046 50,000 -1,386 Good 55 Yes
32 212 365,984 20,000 -1,881 Good 50 Yes
33 212 752,253 128,450 10,000 70 65 Yes
34 212 49,981 7,500 -1,770 Good 50 Not stated
35 212 498,910 15,000 -3,280 Good 50 Not stated
36 212, 214 191,212 25,000 -1,782 Good 50 Yes
37 127, 212, 238 
and 239, 
106,616 20,000 21,524 Good 50 Yes
38 212 1,333,000 230,000 129,451 60 50 Yes
39 212, 238 250,000 100,000 -1,724 60 67 Yes
40 212, 216, 238, 
239 and 847 
CA  
35,000 32,500 -1,421 60 100 Yes
41 MTIC fraud 8,053,931 165,000 3,363 Good 50 Yes
42 212 50,000 57,500 -2,005 65 100 Not stated
43 212, 238, 197 
CA
815,448 278,273 -1,136 Good 75 Yes
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
44 Realise property 
abroad
15,000,000 30,000 -1,180 60 100 Not stated
45 212 and 847 
CA
427,899 15,000 -3,103 Good 50 Not stated
46 197 CA 452,039 6,000 -1,158 Good 100 No 
47 212 50,000 10,000 -1,901 65 50 Yes
48 212, 238 83,829 42,500 136 60 100 Yes
49 212, 847 CA 476,289 15,000 -3,089 Good 50 Not stated
50 212, 847 CA 287,956 15,000 -720 Good 50 Not stated
51 Prof negligence 1,287,225 300,000 -1,743 Real prospect 
of success
75 ATE





53 212 19,224 10,000 -1,461 Good 50 Yes
54 212, 213 283,180 50,000 -1,366 Very good 100 Yes
55 212, 
197 CA
151,259 15,000 -3,289 Good 50 Not stated
56 214 141,864 5,000 -1,136 70 30 Yes
57 Enforcement 
of debt by 
petitioning for 
bankruptcy
549,786 2,500 -1,439 Good 100 Not needed
58 212, 239 111,106 42,500 25 60 100 Yes
59 212, 239 20,000 0 15,614 Good 100 Yes
60 213, 212 1,123,468 100,000 19,458 75 95 Yes
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
61 212 347,309 12,500 -1,425 Not stated 100 Not yet
62 212, 214, 216, 
239
60,000 25,000 -1,079 75 100 Not stated
63 847 CA and 
DLA
521,680 30,000 -808 60 50 Yes if 
needed
64 130 Not stated 2,000 -1,158 Good 75 Not stated
65 238, 239, 212 508,165 30,000 -1,515 Good 50 Yes
66 212, 238, 239, 
423
3,430,025 500,000 226 65 75 Yes
67 212, 213, 214 
and 239
846,000 95,000 1,949 70 100 Yes
68 212 1,150,000 75,000 -347 60 75 Yes
69 212 67,531 7,500 -3,310 Good 50 Not Stated
70 239 18,000 Not known -1,090 Good Not stated No 
71 238 125,500 Not known -1,090 Not stated No
72 238, 239, 212 112,913 10,000 867 Good 50 Yes
73 213, s15 CDDA 136,701 35,000 12,718 75 95 Yes
74 213, s15 CDDA 1,227,000 55,000 -1,180 75 95 Yes
75 212, 238, 239 
and 847 CA
95,630 40,500 -1,136 65 Not stated Yes
76 423 133,404 80,000 Not stated 60 100 Yes
77 212 929,902 70,167 0 Good 25 Yes
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
78 238 1,133,029 100,000 -2,315 Very good 100 Yes
79 423 1,000,000 100,000 -997 70 100 Yes
80 Misrepresentation 
and breach of 
contractual/ 
fiduciary duty




81 DLA 452,039 10,000 -1,158 Good 100 No
82 212, DLA 89,940 12,000 66,552 60 100 Yes
83 127 30,000 7,500 10,299 Good 50 Yes
84 127 and 238 595,000 75,000 0 Good 75 Yes
85 212, 238 and 
239
10,939 5,000 317 70 73 Yes
86 127 60,000 10,000 0 Probable 100 Third Party 
Funder
87 Insurance claim 
under 1930 Act





88 214, 212, 239 749,642 40,000 -385 Good 50 Yes
89 212 250,585 7,500 -477 Good 50 Not stated
90 127, 212 400,000 35,000 -1,070 Good 0 Not stated
91 212 66,139 15,000 -3,356 Good 50 Not stated
92 127, 212, 213, 
238 
2,095,950 200,000 1,724 Good 100 Yes
93 212, 213, 238, 
239
118,679 45,000 5,467 Good 50 Yes
94 212 136,053 20,000 -1,086 Good 100 Yes
95 212, 239 108,251 73,725 5,001 Good 100 Yes
96 213 Not Stated 5,000 -1,299 75 75 If necessary
44
Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
97 212 15,000 11,500 1,014 70 100 If necessary
98 127 207,000 3,000 329 Good 0 No
99 MTIC fraud Not stated 15,000 4,462 Reasonable 100 No
100 212 17,500,000 1,000,000 -1,826 60 100 Yes
101 212 163,889 15,000 -3,320 65 50 If necessary
102 212, 214, 239 850,000 50,000 0 Good 100 Yes
103 212 288,000 5,000 -1,092 90 0 No
104 Guarantee 977,629 10,000 -1,092 65 53 No
105 238, 239 85,000 12,500 1,264 75 TBC Yes
106 212 166,902 50,000 -1,111 Good 50 Yes
107 212 2,820,516 200,000 21,684 75 95 Yes
108 212 128,987 15,000 4,974 Good 50 Not stated
109 212, DLA 154,139 4,000 -2,323 75 100 No
110 127, 212, 214 
and 238
1,200,000 100,000 -292 Good 75 Yes
111 Debt and 212 190,000 20,000 -1,518 High 75 No
112 212, 238 750,000 225,000 0 60 90 Yes
113 212, 127 1,400,000 150,000 -1,195 Good 75 Yes
114 212, 238 126,950 75,000 31,051 Good 75 Yes
45
Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
115 127, 212 301,146 30,000 1,097 65 100 Yes
116 127, 212, 214, 
238 and 239
1,251,019 100,000 -1,272 Very good 100 Yes
117 Debt  24,635 10,000 1,455 Reasonable 87 No
118 Debt 52,000 10,000 -1,167 High prospect 65 Yes
119 127, 212 and 
847 CA
298,355 18,000 697 80 100 Yes
120 238 700,000 75,000 -1,092 65 53 Yes
121 238 36,700 7,500 130 Good 70 Yes
122 212, 238 1,014,065 250,000 -1,202 Good 75 Yes
123 127 2,592 650 1,021 Very good 0 No
124 Possession and 
sale
1,750,000 10,000 -1,469 65 50 Yes
125 127, 212, 239 
and 847 CA
180,000 50,000 436 70 50 Yes
126 239 20,000 20,000 0 Good 50 No
127 212, 213 2,132,175 150,000 -1,202 65 75
128 Civil claimant 
as part of 
Swiss criminal 
proceedings
400,000 30,000 -755 50 50 No
129 127 20,862 3,500 0 Very high 0 No
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Type of Action Value of 
Claim
Base Costs Value of 
estate
Success % CFA uplift 
%
ATE
130 212 230,311 50,000 6 Good 100 No
131 127 108,550 50,000 10,177 Good 75 No
132 212, 847 CA 85,000 15,000 -1,473 65 50 If necessary
133 212, 847 CA 2,508,953 255,000 0 60 100 Yes or 3P 
Funding
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Appendix B 
R3 survey questions and responses, December 2015
Question 1






Appointment taker/Responding on behalf of appointment 
taker
54.3% 183





Appointment taker/Responding on 
behalf of appointment taker
NOT an Appointment




Are you an appointment 
taker/responding on behalf of an 
appointment taker? 
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Question 2
In the last 12 months, how many cases have you undertaken using a CFA? This includes 







Don’t Know 2.2% 4
One or more cases (Please state how many. Please enter a 






One or more cases (please
state how many. Please enter 
a numeric figure e.g. ‘4’, not ‘four’.)75.8%
21.9%
2.2%
In the last 12 months, how many cases 
have you undertaken using a CFA? This 
includes approaching your legal team 




























Cases undertaken by IPs in







One or more cases (please
state how many. Please enter 
a numeric figure e.g. ‘4’, not ‘four’.)75.8%
21.9%
2.2%
In the last 12 months, how many cases 
have you undertaken using a CFA? This 
includes approaching your legal team 




























Cases undertaken by IPs in
the last 12 months using CFA
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Question 3
Answered by people that did not undertake a case using a CFA in the last 12 months
Have you ever pursued any insolvency litigation using a CFA or approached your legal 














Have you ever pursued any insolvency 
litigation using a CFA or approached 
your legal team with a view to use 
a CFA?  
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Question 4
Answered by people that had used a CFA in the last 12 months








Don’t know 25.2% 33
One or more cases would have gone ahead (Please state 






One or more cases (please
state how many. Please enter 
a numeric figure e.g. ‘4’, not ‘four’.)51.1%
23.7% 25.2% If the 'insolvency exemption' had 
ceased in April 2015, how many 






% of cases actually 
undertaken 9.78%
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Question 5
Answered by people that had undertaken a CFA in the last 12 months
How many of your cases in the past 12 months have been rejected by your legal team for 







Don’t know 7.0% 9
One or more cases have been rejected (Please state how 






One or more cases have been rejected 
(Please state how many. Please enter 
a numeric figure e.g. '4' not 'four'.)79.1%
7.0%14.0%
How many of your cases in the past 12 
months have been rejected by your legal 
team for the use of a CFA? 





% of cases undertaken 3.59%
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Question 6
Answered by people that have not undertaken a CFA in the last 12 months (excl. people that 
have never used a CFA)
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any 
insolvency litigation using a CFA in the past 12 months. Please select all that apply. If 
none of these options apply, please write in your answer under ‘other’. NB. If you have 
approached your lawyers about using a CFA in a case and they have rejected the case, 






I haven’t come across cases where the use of a CFA would 
be appropriate
56.3% 18
I use third party funders instead 12.5% 4
Creditors not in support of the action 6.3% 2
Cases too uncertain 40.6% 13
The amount of money was too low to warrant action 37.5% 12
The threat of losing the ‘insolvency exemption’ has made the 
use of a CFA unattractive
18.8% 6
Other (please specify) 6.3% 2
answered question 32
skipped question 305
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any insolvency 






















I haven’t come 
across cases 
where the use 



















has made the 
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Question 7
Answered by people that had never undertaken a CFA
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any 
insolvency litigation using a CFA? Please select all that apply. If none of these options 
apply, please write in your answer under ‘other’. NB. If you have approached your 
lawyers about using a CFA in a case and they have rejected the case, this still counts as 






I haven’t come across cases where the use of a CFA would 
be appropriate
81.8% 9
I use third party funders instead 0.0% 0
Creditors not in support of the action 0.0% 0
Cases too uncertain 27.3% 3
The amount of money was too low to warrant action 27.3% 3
The threat of losing the ‘insolvency exemption’ has made the 
use of a CFA unattractive
9.1% 1
Other (please specify) 9.1% 1
answered question 11
skipped question 326
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any insolvency 



















I haven’t come 
across cases 
where the use 



















has made the 
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Question 8
Answered by anyone that has used a CFA before
Looking back at your individual caseload, approximately how much value (in total) was 
brought back into insolvent estates with which you are involved by CFA-backed litigation 
in the last 12 months? Please include any value returned from any of your cases 







Don’t know 14.2% 22
£1 or more (Please state how much. Please enter a 
numeric figure e.g. ‘4’ not ‘four’. Do not include the ‘£’ 






£1 or more (Please state how much. 
Please enter a numeric figure e.g. '4' 
not 'four'. Do not include the '£' sign. 





Looking back at your individual caseload, 
approximately how much value (in total) 
was brought back into insolvent estates 
with which you are involved by 
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Question 9
Answered by anyone that has used a CFA
Before a CFA is agreed with your legal team, on average, what % likelihood of success 






Don’t know 26.0% 40
0-100% (Please state. Please enter a numeric figure e.g. ‘4’ 





0-100% (Please state. Please enter a 
numeric figure e.g. '4' not 'four'. Please 
do not include the '%' sign)
26.0%
74.0%
Before a CFA is agreed with your legal 
team, on average, what % likelihood of 




% success demanded by legal teams prior to agreeing CFA-backed course of action


















40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99%
% success emanded by legal teams prior to agreeing CFA-
backed course of action 
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Question 10
Answered by all appointment takers
Have you ever undertaken any insolvency litigation by applying to third party litigation 














Have you ever undertaken any 
insolvency litigation by applying to third 
party litigation funders (either for funding 
or by proposing an assignment of 
insolvency claims to the funder)?   
57
Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
Question 11
Answered by all who have used a third party funder







Don’t know 5.0% 4
One or more claims (Please state how many. Please enter a 






One or more claims (Please state how 
many. Please enter a numeric figure 
e.g. '4' not 'four')52.5%
5.0%
42.5%
In the last 12 months, how many claims 
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Question 12
Answered by all who used a third party funder last year







Third party funders used by IPs in last 12 months




Answered by all who used a third party funder last year 
 
Which third party funders have you used in the last 12 months? 
Answer Options Response Count 
  42 
answered question 42 














25 Third party funders used by IPs in last 12 months 
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Question 13
Answered by all who didn’t use a third party funder last year
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any 







I haven’t come across cases where the use of a third party 
funder would be appropriate
39.5% 15
I use CFAs instead 36.8% 14
A higher return was likely without the use of a third party 
funder
21.1% 8
Creditors not in support due to loss of control of the action 10.5% 4
Creditors not in support due to likely reduced return 7.9% 3
Cases too uncertain to be attractive to a third party funder 44.7% 17
The amount of money was too low for a third party funder to 
be interested
21.1% 8
The timing was too tight for a third party funder to take on 
the action
2.6% 1
The case involved fraud and would therefore be unlikely to 
be taken on by a third party funder
0.0% 0
The defendant appeared to have no significant assets so a 
third party funder would not be interested
21.1% 8
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Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any insolvency 






























here the use 












of a third party funder
C
reditors not in
support due to loss of
control of the action
C
reditors not in











 for a third





tight for a third party






to be taken on by a 
third party funder
The defendant
appeared to have no
significant assets so a







Insolvency Litigation and the Jackson Reforms –   
An Update
Question 14
Answered by those who have never used a third party funder
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any 






I haven’t come across cases where the use of a third party 
funder would be appropriate
26.8% 22
I use CFAs instead 58.5% 48
A higher return was likely without the use of a third party 
funder
42.7% 35
Creditors not in support due to loss of control of the action 8.5% 7
Creditors not in support due to likely reduced return 12.2% 10
Cases too uncertain to be attractive to a third party funder 35.4% 29
The amount of money was too low for a third party funder to 
be interested
32.9% 27
The timing was too tight for a third party funder to take on 
the action
2.4% 2
The case involved fraud and would therefore be unlikely to 
be taken on by a third party funder
6.1% 5
The defendant appeared to have no significant assets so a 
third party funder would not be interested
9.8% 8
Other (please specify) 11.0% 9
answered question 82
skipped question 255
Which of the reasons listed below, if any, explain why you have not undertaken any insolvency 



























here the use 












of a third party funder
C
reditors not in
support due to loss of
control of the action
C
reditors not in











 for a third
























to be taken on by a
 third party funder
The defendant
appeared to have no
significant assets so a
third party funder 
w
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Question 15
Answered by all those who have used a third party funder
Looking back at your individual caseload, approximately how much (in value) was brought 
back into insolvent estates with which you are involved by the use of third party funders 
in the last year? Please include any value returned from any of your cases regardless of 







Don’t know 21.3% 17
£1 or more (Please state how much. Please enter a numeric 
figure e.g. ‘4’ not ‘four’. Do not include the ‘£’ sign. Please 






£1 or more (Please state how much. 
Please enter a numeric figure e.g. '4' 
not 'four'. Do not include the '£' sign. 




Looking back at your individual 
caseload, approximately how much (in 
value) was brought back into insolvent 
estates with which you are involved by 
the use of third party funders in the last 
year? Please include any value returned 
from any of your cases regardless of 




% of total returns 9.29%
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Question 16
Answered by those who have used a third party funder
Thinking about times when you have used a third party funder, what factors influenced 






My firm does not possess the capacity in terms of expertise 
or funding to pursue the case, whereas the third party funder 
did
40.3% 31
Third party funders cover the cost of my work-in-progress in 
relation to the claim
18.2% 14
I did not wish to take the risk to my firm’s profitability and 
sustainability involved in bringing significant litigation  
50.6% 39
Other (please specify) 24.7% 19
answered question 77
skipped question 260
Thinking about times when you have used a third party funder, what factors influenced your 
















My firm does not possess
the capacity in terms of
expertise or funding to
pursue the case, whereas
the third party funder did
Third party funders cover
the cost of my work-in-
progress in relation to the
claim
I did not wish to take the 
risk to my firm’s 
profitability and 
sustainability involved in 
bringing significant 
litigation   
Other (please specify)
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Question 17
Answered by those who have used a third party funder








Don’t know 5.2% 4
One or more (Please state how many. Please enter a numeric 






One or more (Please state how many. 
Please enter a numeric figure 




How many of your cases in the past 12 
months have been rejected by a third 
party funder? 





% of cases undertaken 43.75%
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Question 18
Answered by those that have used third party funders







Don’t know 45.5% 35
0-100% (Please state. Please enter a numeric figure e.g. ‘4’ 





0-100% (Please state. Please enter a 
numeric figure e.g. '4' not 'four'. 
Please do not include the '%' sign)45.5%
54.5%
When applying to a third party funder, on 
average, what % likelihood of success 
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Average % chance of success demanded by third party funders before funding

















20-29% 30-39% 40-49% 50-59% 60-69% 70-79% 80-89% 90-99%
Average % chance of success demanded by third party 
funders before funding 
67










Stop or decrease the amount of litigation work currently 
carried out
49.1% 138
Reduce or decrease the number of cases taken on where 
there are few or no assets available to fund litigation
63.0% 177
Seek to use third party funders 54.4% 153
Use Damages Based Agreements to fund litigation 21.4% 60
Carry on as before using CFAs 22.4% 63
Other (please specify) 7.8% 22
answered question 281
skipped question 56












































If the ‘insolvency exemption’ ends, and in the future you conduct litigation using a third 







Returns to creditors would be the same as under the current 
funding regime
1.4% 4
Returns to creditors would be less than under the current 
funding regime  
86.3% 239
Returns to creditors would be higher than under the current 
funding regime
4.0% 11
Don’t know 8.3% 23
answered question 277
skipped question 60
Returns to creditors would be the same 
as under the current funding regime
Returns to creditors would be less than 
under the current funding regime
Returns to creditors would be higher 




If the 'insolvency exemption' ends, and 
in the future you conduct litigation using 
a third party funder, which of the 
following do you think would best apply 
















Don’t know 4.3% 12
One or more (Please state how many. Please enter a numeric 






One or more (Please state how many. 
Please enter a numeric figure 
e.g. '4' not 'four')
4.3% 5.8%
89.9%
How many claims have you undertaken 
using a Damages Based Agreement in 
the last 12 months? 










The uncertainty surrounding the ‘insolvency exemption’ has led to the following 






I have taken on more cases 4.4% 12
I have taken on fewer cases 17.0% 46
I have made enquiries of third party funders more than I 
would have done previously
48.5% 131
The costs of ATE insurance have increased 37.8% 102
Other (please specify) 20.7% 56
answered question 270
skipped question 67
The uncertainty surrounding the ‘insolvency exemption’ has led to the following consequences... 


















I have taken on
more cases
I have taken on
fewer cases
I have made
enquiries of third
party funders
more than I
would have
done previously
The costs of
ATE insurance
have increased
Other (please
specify)
